

Artificial Intelligence A Modern Approach

*Third Edition*

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Artificial Intelligence

A Modern Approach

*Third Edition*

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*For Loy, Gordon, Lucy, George, and Isaac* — S.J.R. *For Kris, Isabella, and Juliet* — P.N.

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Preface

**Artificial Intelligence** (AI) is a big field, and this is a big book. We have tried to explore the full breadth of the field, which encompasses logic, probability, and continuous mathematics; perception, reasoning, learning, and action; and everything from microelectronic devices to robotic planetary explorers. The book is also big because we go into some depth.

The subtitle of this book is “A Modern Approach.” The intended meaning of this rather empty phrase is that we have tried to synthesize what is now known into a common frame work, rather than trying to explain each subfield of AI in its own historical context. We apologize to those whose subfields are, as a result, less recognizable.

**New to this edition**

This edition captures the changes in AI that have taken place since the last edition in 2003. There have been important applications of AI technology, such as the widespread deploy ment of practical speech recognition, machine translation, autonomous vehicles, and house hold robotics. There have been algorithmic landmarks, such as the solution of the game of checkers. And there has been a great deal of theoretical progress, particularly in areas such as probabilistic reasoning, machine learning, and computer vision. Most important from our point of view is the continued evolution in how we think about the field, and thus how we organize the book. The major changes are as follows:

• We place more emphasis on partially observable and nondeterministic environments, especially in the nonprobabilistic settings of search and planning. The concepts of *belief state* (a set of possible worlds) and *state estimation* (maintaining the belief state) are introduced in these settings; later in the book, we add probabilities.

• In addition to discussing the types of environments and types of agents, we now cover in more depth the types of *representations* that an agent can use. We distinguish among *atomic* representations (in which each state of the world is treated as a black box), *factored* representations (in which a state is a set of attribute/value pairs), and *structured* representations (in which the world consists of objects and relations between them).

• Our coverage of planning goes into more depth on contingent planning in partially observable environments and includes a new approach to hierarchical planning. • We have added new material on first-order probabilistic models, including *open-universe* models for cases where there is uncertainty as to what objects exist.

• We have completely rewritten the introductory machine-learning chapter, stressing a wider variety of more modern learning algorithms and placing them on a firmer theo retical footing.

• We have expanded coverage of Web search and information extraction, and of tech niques for learning from very large data sets.

• 20% of the citations in this edition are to works published after 2003. • We estimate that about 20% of the material is brand new. The remaining 80% reflects older work but has been largely rewritten to present a more unified picture of the field.

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**Overview of the book**

The main unifying theme is the idea of an **intelligent agent**. We define AI as the study of agents that receive percepts from the environment and perform actions. Each such agent im plements a function that maps percept sequences to actions, and we cover different ways to represent these functions, such as reactive agents, real-time planners, and decision-theoretic systems. We explain the role of learning as extending the reach of the designer into unknown environments, and we show how that role constrains agent design, favoring explicit knowl edge representation and reasoning. We treat robotics and vision not as independently defined problems, but as occurring in the service of achieving goals. We stress the importance of the task environment in determining the appropriate agent design.

Our primary aim is to convey the *ideas* that have emerged over the past fifty years of AI research and the past two millennia of related work. We have tried to avoid excessive formal ity in the presentation of these ideas while retaining precision. We have included pseudocode algorithms to make the key ideas concrete; our pseudocode is described in Appendix B.

This book is primarily intended for use in an undergraduate course or course sequence. The book has 27 chapters, each requiring about a week’s worth of lectures, so working through the whole book requires a two-semester sequence. A one-semester course can use selected chapters to suit the interests of the instructor and students. The book can also be used in a graduate-level course (perhaps with the addition of some of the primary sources suggested in the bibliographical notes). Sample syllabi are available at the book’s Web site, aima.cs.berkeley.edu. The only prerequisite is familiarity with basic concepts of computer science (algorithms, data structures, complexity) at a sophomore level. Freshman calculus and linear algebra are useful for some of the topics; the required mathematical back ground is supplied in Appendix A.

Exercises are given at the end of each chapter. Exercises requiring significant pro gramming are marked with a **keyboard** icon. These exercises can best be solved by taking advantage of the code repository at aima.cs.berkeley.edu. Some of them are large enough to be considered term projects. A number of exercises require some investigation of the literature; these are marked with a **book** icon.

Throughout the book, important points are marked with a *pointing* icon. We have in cluded an extensive index of around 6,000 items to make it easy to find things in the book. NEW TERM Wherever a **new term** is first defined, it is also marked in the margin.

**About the Web site**

aima.cs.berkeley.edu, the Web site for the book, contains

• implementations of the algorithms in the book in several programming languages, • a list of over 1000 schools that have used the book, many with links to online course materials and syllabi,

• an annotated list of over 800 links to sites around the Web with useful AI content, • a chapter-by-chapter list of supplementary material and links,

• instructions on how to join a discussion group for the book,

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• instructions on how to contact the authors with questions or comments,

• instructions on how to report errors in the book, in the likely event that some exist, and • slides and other materials for instructors.

Pearson offers many different products around the world to facilitate learning. In countries outside the United States, some products and services related to this textbook may not be available due to copyright and/or permissions restrictions. If you have questions, you can contact your local office by visiting www.pearsonhighered.com/international or you can con tact your local Pearson representative.

**About the cover**

The cover depicts the final position from the decisive game 6 of the 1997 match between chess champion Garry Kasparov and program DEEP BLUE. Kasparov, playing Black, was forced to resign, making this the first time a computer had beaten a world champion in a chess match. Kasparov is shown at the top. To his left is the Asimo humanoid robot and to his right is Thomas Bayes (1702–1761), whose ideas about probability as a measure of belief underlie much of modern AI technology. Below that we see a Mars Exploration Rover, a robot that landed on Mars in 2004 and has been exploring the planet ever since. To the right is Alan Turing (1912–1954), whose fundamental work defined the fields of computer science in general and artificial intelligence in particular. At the bottom is Shakey (1966– 1972), the first robot to combine perception, world-modeling, planning, and learning. With Shakey is project leader Charles Rosen (1917–2002). At the bottom right is Aristotle (384 B.C.–322 B.C.), who pioneered the study of logic; his work was state of the art until the 19th century (copy of a bust by Lysippos). At the bottom left, lightly screened behind the authors’ names, is a planning algorithm by Aristotle from *De Motu Animalium* in the original Greek. Behind the title is a portion of the CPSC Bayesian network for medical diagnosis (Pradhan *et al*., 1994). Behind the chess board is part of a Bayesian logic model for detecting nuclear explosions from seismic signals.

Credits: Stan Honda/Getty (Kasparaov), Library of Congress (Bayes), NASA (Mars rover), National Museum of Rome (Aristotle), Peter Norvig (book), Ian Parker (Berkeley skyline), Shutterstock (Asimo, Chess pieces), Time Life/Getty (Shakey, Turing).

**Acknowledgments**

This book would not have been possible without the many contributors whose names did not make it to the cover. Jitendra Malik and David Forsyth wrote Chapter 24 (computer vision) and Sebastian Thrun wrote Chapter 25 (robotics). Vibhu Mittal wrote part of Chapter 22 (natural language). Nick Hay, Mehran Sahami, and Ernest Davis wrote some of the exercises. Zoran Duric (George Mason), Thomas C. Henderson (Utah), Leon Reznik (RIT), Michael Gourley (Central Oklahoma) and Ernest Davis (NYU) reviewed the manuscript and made helpful suggestions. We thank Ernie Davis in particular for his tireless ability to read multiple drafts and help improve the book. Nick Hay whipped the bibliography into shape and on deadline stayed up to 5:30 AM writing code to make the book better. Jon Barron formatted and improved the diagrams in this edition, while Tim Huang, Mark Paskin, and Cynthia

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Bruyns helped with diagrams and algorithms in previous editions. Ravi Mohan and Ciaran O’Reilly wrote and maintain the Java code examples on the Web site. John Canny wrote the robotics chapter for the first edition and Douglas Edwards researched the historical notes. Tracy Dunkelberger, Allison Michael, Scott Disanno, and Jane Bonnell at Pearson tried their best to keep us on schedule and made many helpful suggestions. Most helpful of all has been Julie Sussman, P.P.A., who read every chapter and provided extensive improvements. In previous editions we had proofreaders who would tell us when we left out a comma and said *which* when we meant *that*; Julie told us when we left out a minus sign and said xi when we meant xj . For every typo or confusing explanation that remains in the book, rest assured that Julie has fixed at least five. She persevered even when a power failure forced her to work by lantern light rather than LCD glow.

**Stuart would like to thank** his parents for their support and encouragement and his wife, Loy Sheflott, for her endless patience and boundless wisdom. He hopes that Gordon, Lucy, George, and Isaac will soon be reading this book after they have forgiven him for working so long on it. RUGS (Russell’s Unusual Group of Students) have been unusually helpful, as always.

**Peter would like to thank** his parents (Torsten and Gerda) for getting him started, and his wife (Kris), children (Bella and Juliet), colleagues, and friends for encouraging and tolerating him through the long hours of writing and longer hours of rewriting.

**We both thank** the librarians at Berkeley, Stanford, and NASA and the developers of CiteSeer, Wikipedia, and Google, who have revolutionized the way we do research. We can’t acknowledge all the people who have used the book and made suggestions, but we would like to note the especially helpful comments of Gagan Aggarwal, Eyal Amir, Ion Androutsopou los, Krzysztof Apt, Warren Haley Armstrong, Ellery Aziel, Jeff Van Baalen, Darius Bacon, Brian Baker, Shumeet Baluja, Don Barker, Tony Barrett, James Newton Bass, Don Beal, Howard Beck, Wolfgang Bibel, John Binder, Larry Bookman, David R. Boxall, Ronen Braf man, John Bresina, Gerhard Brewka, Selmer Bringsjord, Carla Brodley, Chris Brown, Emma Brunskill, Wilhelm Burger, Lauren Burka, Carlos Bustamante, Joao Cachopo, Murray Camp bell, Norman Carver, Emmanuel Castro, Anil Chakravarthy, Dan Chisarick, Berthe Choueiry, Roberto Cipolla, David Cohen, James Coleman, Julie Ann Comparini, Corinna Cortes, Gary Cottrell, Ernest Davis, Tom Dean, Rina Dechter, Tom Dietterich, Peter Drake, Chuck Dyer, Doug Edwards, Robert Egginton, Asma’a El-Budrawy, Barbara Engelhardt, Kutluhan Erol, Oren Etzioni, Hana Filip, Douglas Fisher, Jeffrey Forbes, Ken Ford, Eric Fosler-Lussier, John Fosler, Jeremy Frank, Alex Franz, Bob Futrelle, Marek Galecki, Stefan Gerberding, Stuart Gill, Sabine Glesner, Seth Golub, Gosta Grahne, Russ Greiner, Eric Grimson, Bar bara Grosz, Larry Hall, Steve Hanks, Othar Hansson, Ernst Heinz, Jim Hendler, Christoph Herrmann, Paul Hilfinger, Robert Holte, Vasant Honavar, Tim Huang, Seth Hutchinson, Joost Jacob, Mark Jelasity, Magnus Johansson, Istvan Jonyer, Dan Jurafsky, Leslie Kaelbling, Keiji Kanazawa, Surekha Kasibhatla, Simon Kasif, Henry Kautz, Gernot Kerschbaumer, Max Khesin, Richard Kirby, Dan Klein, Kevin Knight, Roland Koenig, Sven Koenig, Daphne Koller, Rich Korf, Benjamin Kuipers, James Kurien, John Lafferty, John Laird, Gus Lars son, John Lazzaro, Jon LeBlanc, Jason Leatherman, Frank Lee, Jon Lehto, Edward Lim, Phil Long, Pierre Louveaux, Don Loveland, Sridhar Mahadevan, Tony Mancill, Jim Martin,

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**Stuart Russell** was born in 1962 in Portsmouth, England. He received his B.A. with first class honours in physics from Oxford University in 1982, and his Ph.D. in computer science from Stanford in 1986. He then joined the faculty of the University of California at Berkeley, where he is a professor of computer science, director of the Center for Intelligent Systems, and holder of the Smith–Zadeh Chair in Engineering. In 1990, he received the Presidential Young Investigator Award of the National Science Foundation, and in 1995 he was cowinner of the Computers and Thought Award. He was a 1996 Miller Professor of the University of California and was appointed to a Chancellor’s Professorship in 2000. In 1998, he gave the Forsythe Memorial Lectures at Stanford University. He is a Fellow and former Executive Council member of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence. He has published over 100 papers on a wide range of topics in artificial intelligence. His other books include *The Use of Knowledge in Analogy and Induction* and (with Eric Wefald) *Do the Right Thing: Studies in Limited Rationality.*

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****1 INTRODUCTION

*In which we try to explain why we consider artificial intelligence to be a subject most worthy of study, and in which we try to decide what exactly it is, this being a good thing to decide before embarking.*

INTELLIGENCE We call ourselves *Homo sapiens*—man the wise—because our **intelligence** is so important to us. For thousands of years, we have tried to understand *how we think*; that is, how a mere handful of matter can perceive, understand, predict, and manipulate a world far larger and

more complicated than itself. The field of **artificial intelligence**, or AI, goes further still: it ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCEattempts not just to understand but also to *build* intelligent entities. AI is one of the newest fields in science and engineering. Work started in earnest soon after World War II, and the name itself was coined in 1956. Along with molecular biology, AI is regularly cited as the “field I would most like to be in” by scientists in other disciplines. A student in physics might reasonably feel that all the good ideas have already been taken by Galileo, Newton, Einstein, and the rest. AI, on the other hand, still has openings for several full-time Einsteins and Edisons.

AI currently encompasses a huge variety of subfields, ranging from the general (learning and perception) to the specific, such as playing chess, proving mathematical theorems, writing poetry, driving a car on a crowded street, and diagnosing diseases. AI is relevant to any intellectual task; it is truly a universal field.

1.1 WHAT IS AI?



We have claimed that AI is exciting, but we have not said what it *is*. In Figure 1.1 we see eight definitions of AI, laid out along two dimensions. The definitions on top are concerned with *thought processes* and *reasoning*, whereas the ones on the bottom address *behavior*. The definitions on the left measure success in terms of fidelity to *human* performance, whereas

RATIONALITY the ones on the right measure against an *ideal* performance measure, called **rationality**. A system is rational if it does the “right thing,” given what it knows.

Historically, all four approaches to AI have been followed, each by different people with different methods. A human-centered approach must be in part an empirical science, in

1

2 Chapter 1. Introduction 

**Thinking Humanly Thinking Rationally** 

“The exciting new effort to make comput ers think ... *machines with minds*, in the full and literal sense.” (Haugeland, 1985) 

“[The automation of] activities that we associate with human thinking, activities such as decision-making, problem solv ing, learning ...” (Bellman, 1978) 

“The study of mental faculties through the use of computational models.” 

(Charniak and McDermott, 1985)

“The study of the computations that make it possible to perceive, reason, and act.” (Winston, 1992) 

**Acting Humanly Acting Rationally **

“The art of creating machines that per form functions that require intelligence when performed by people.” (Kurzweil, 1990) 

“The study of how to make computers do things at which, at the moment, people are better.” (Rich and Knight, 1991) 

“Computational Intelligence is the study of the design of intelligent agents.” (Poole *et al.*, 1998) 

“AI . . . is concerned with intelligent be havior in artifacts.” (Nilsson, 1998) 



**Figure 1.1** Some definitions of artificial intelligence, organized into four categories.



volving observations and hypotheses about human behavior. A rationalist1approach involves a combination of mathematics and engineering. The various group have both disparaged and helped each other. Let us look at the four approaches in more detail.

**1.1.1 Acting humanly: The Turing Test approach**

TURING TEST The **Turing Test**, proposed by Alan Turing (1950), was designed to provide a satisfactory operational definition of intelligence. A computer passes the test if a human interrogator, after posing some written questions, cannot tell whether the written responses come from a person or from a computer. Chapter 26 discusses the details of the test and whether a computer would really be intelligent if it passed. For now, we note that programming a computer to pass a rigorously applied test provides plenty to work on. The computer would need to possess the following capabilities:

• **natural language processing** to enable it to communicate successfully in English; NATURAL LANGUAGE

PROCESSING

• **knowledge representation** to store what it knows or hears; KNOWLEDGE

REPRESENTATION

AUTOMATED

REASONING • **automated reasoning** to use the stored information to answer questions and to draw new conclusions;

MACHINE LEARNING • **machine learning** to adapt to new circumstances and to detect and extrapolate patterns.

1 By distinguishing between *human* and *rational* behavior, we are not suggesting that humans are necessarily “irrational” in the sense of “emotionally unstable” or “insane.” One merely need note that we are not perfect: not all chess players are grandmasters; and, unfortunately, not everyone gets an A on the exam. Some systematic errors in human reasoning are cataloged by Kahneman *et al.* (1982).

Section 1.1. What Is AI? 3 

Turing’s test deliberately avoided direct physical interaction between the interrogator and the computer, because *physical* simulation of a person is unnecessary for intelligence. However, TOTAL TURING TEST the so-called **total Turing Test** includes a video signal so that the interrogator can test the subject’s perceptual abilities, as well as the opportunity for the interrogator to pass physical objects “through the hatch.” To pass the total Turing Test, the computer will need

COMPUTER VISION • **computer vision** to perceive objects, and

ROBOTICS • **robotics** to manipulate objects and move about.

These six disciplines compose most of AI, and Turing deserves credit for designing a test that remains relevant 60 years later. Yet AI researchers have devoted little effort to passing the Turing Test, believing that it is more important to study the underlying principles of in telligence than to duplicate an exemplar. The quest for “artificial flight” succeeded when the Wright brothers and others stopped imitating birds and started using wind tunnels and learn ing about aerodynamics. Aeronautical engineering texts do not define the goal of their field as making “machines that fly so exactly like pigeons that they can fool even other pigeons.”

**1.1.2 Thinking humanly: The cognitive modeling approach**

If we are going to say that a given program thinks like a human, we must have some way of determining how humans think. We need to get *inside* the actual workings of human minds. There are three ways to do this: through introspection—trying to catch our own thoughts as they go by; through psychological experiments—observing a person in action; and through brain imaging—observing the brain in action. Once we have a sufficiently precise theory of the mind, it becomes possible to express the theory as a computer program. If the program’s input–output behavior matches corresponding human behavior, that is evidence that some of the program’s mechanisms could also be operating in humans. For example, Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, who developed GPS, the “General Problem Solver” (Newell and Simon, 1961), were not content merely to have their program solve problems correctly. They were more concerned with comparing the trace of its reasoning steps to traces of human subjects

COGNITIVE SCIENCE solving the same problems. The interdisciplinary field of **cognitive science** brings together computer models from AI and experimental techniques from psychology to construct precise and testable theories of the human mind.

Cognitive science is a fascinating field in itself, worthy of several textbooks and at least one encyclopedia (Wilson and Keil, 1999). We will occasionally comment on similarities or differences between AI techniques and human cognition. Real cognitive science, however, is necessarily based on experimental investigation of actual humans or animals. We will leave that for other books, as we assume the reader has only a computer for experimentation.

In the early days of AI there was often confusion between the approaches: an author would argue that an algorithm performs well on a task and that it is *therefore* a good model of human performance, or vice versa. Modern authors separate the two kinds of claims; this distinction has allowed both AI and cognitive science to develop more rapidly. The two fields continue to fertilize each other, most notably in computer vision, which incorporates neurophysiological evidence into computational models.

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**1.1.3 Thinking rationally: The “laws of thought” approach**

The Greek philosopher Aristotle was one of the first to attempt to codify “right thinking,” that SYLLOGISM is, irrefutable reasoning processes. His **syllogisms** provided patterns for argument structures that always yielded correct conclusions when given correct premises—for example, “Socrates is a man; all men are mortal; therefore, Socrates is mortal.” These laws of thought were

LOGIC supposed to govern the operation of the mind; their study initiated the field called **logic**. Logicians in the 19th century developed a precise notation for statements about all kinds of objects in the world and the relations among them. (Contrast this with ordinary arithmetic notation, which provides only for statements about *numbers*.) By 1965, programs existed that could, in principle, solve *any* solvable problem described in logical notation. (Although LOGICIST if no solution exists, the program might loop forever.) The so-called **logicist** tradition within artificial intelligence hopes to build on such programs to create intelligent systems. There are two main obstacles to this approach. First, it is not easy to take informal knowledge and state it in the formal terms required by logical notation, particularly when the knowledge is less than 100% certain. Second, there is a big difference between solving a problem “in principle” and solving it in practice. Even problems with just a few hundred facts can exhaust the computational resources of any computer unless it has some guidance as to which reasoning steps to try first. Although both of these obstacles apply to *any* attempt to build computational reasoning systems, they appeared first in the logicist tradition.

**1.1.4 Acting rationally: The rational agent approach**

AGENT An **agent** is just something that acts (*agent* comes from the Latin *agere*, to do). Of course, all computer programs do something, but computer agents are expected to do more: operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to

RATIONAL AGENT change, and create and pursue goals. A **rational agent** is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome.

In the “laws of thought” approach to AI, the emphasis was on correct inferences. Mak ing correct inferences is sometimes *part* of being a rational agent, because one way to act rationally is to reason logically to the conclusion that a given action will achieve one’s goals and then to act on that conclusion. On the other hand, correct inference is not *all* of ration ality; in some situations, there is no provably correct thing to do, but something must still be done. There are also ways of acting rationally that cannot be said to involve inference. For example, recoiling from a hot stove is a reflex action that is usually more successful than a slower action taken after careful deliberation.

All the skills needed for the Turing Test also allow an agent to act rationally. Knowledge representation and reasoning enable agents to reach good decisions. We need to be able to generate comprehensible sentences in natural language to get by in a complex society. We need learning not only for erudition, but also because it improves our ability to generate effective behavior.

The rational-agent approach has two advantages over the other approaches. First, it is more general than the “laws of thought” approach because correct inference is just one of several possible mechanisms for achieving rationality. Second, it is more amenable to

Section 1.2. The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence 5 

scientific development than are approaches based on human behavior or human thought. The standard of rationality is mathematically well defined and completely general, and can be “unpacked” to generate agent designs that provably achieve it. Human behavior, on the other hand, is well adapted for one specific environment and is defined by, well, the sum total of all the things that humans do. *This book therefore concentrates on general principles of rational agents and on components for constructing them.* We will see that despite the apparent simplicity with which the problem can be stated, an enormous variety of issues come up when we try to solve it. Chapter 2 outlines some of these issues in more detail.

One important point to keep in mind: We will see before too long that achieving perfect rationality—always doing the right thing—is not feasible in complicated environments. The computational demands are just too high. For most of the book, however, we will adopt the working hypothesis that perfect rationality is a good starting point for analysis. It simplifies the problem and provides the appropriate setting for most of the foundational material in the field. Chapters 5 and 17 deal explicitly with the issue of **limited rationality**—acting LIMITED

RATIONALITY

appropriately when there is not enough time to do all the computations one might like.

1.2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE



In this section, we provide a brief history of the disciplines that contributed ideas, viewpoints, and techniques to AI. Like any history, this one is forced to concentrate on a small number of people, events, and ideas and to ignore others that also were important. We organize the history around a series of questions. We certainly would not wish to give the impression that these questions are the only ones the disciplines address or that the disciplines have all been working toward AI as their ultimate fruition.

**1.2.1 Philosophy**

• Can formal rules be used to draw valid conclusions?

• How does the mind arise from a physical brain?

• Where does knowledge come from?

• How does knowledge lead to action?

Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), whose bust appears on the front cover of this book, was the first to formulate a precise set of laws governing the rational part of the mind. He developed an informal system of syllogisms for proper reasoning, which in principle allowed one to gener ate conclusions mechanically, given initial premises. Much later, Ramon Lull (d. 1315) had the idea that useful reasoning could actually be carried out by a mechanical artifact. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) proposed that reasoning was like numerical computation, that “we add and subtract in our silent thoughts.” The automation of computation itself was already well under way. Around 1500, Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) designed but did not build a me chanical calculator; recent reconstructions have shown the design to be functional. The first known calculating machine was constructed around 1623 by the German scientist Wilhelm Schickard (1592–1635), although the Pascaline, built in 1642 by Blaise Pascal (1623–1662),

6 Chapter 1. Introduction 

is more famous. Pascal wrote that “the arithmetical machine produces effects which appear nearer to thought than all the actions of animals.” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) built a mechanical device intended to carry out operations on concepts rather than numbers, but its scope was rather limited. Leibniz did surpass Pascal by building a calculator that could add, subtract, multiply, and take roots, whereas the Pascaline could only add and sub tract. Some speculated that machines might not just do calculations but actually be able to think and act on their own. In his 1651 book *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes suggested the idea of an “artificial animal,” arguing “For what is the heart but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels.”

It’s one thing to say that the mind operates, at least in part, according to logical rules, and to build physical systems that emulate some of those rules; it’s another to say that the mind itself *is* such a physical system. Ren´e Descartes (1596–1650) gave the first clear discussion of the distinction between mind and matter and of the problems that arise. One problem with a purely physical conception of the mind is that it seems to leave little room for free will: if the mind is governed entirely by physical laws, then it has no more free will than a rock “deciding” to fall toward the center of the earth. Descartes was a strong advocate of the power

RATIONALISM of reasoning in understanding the world, a philosophy now called **rationalism**, and one that DUALISM counts Aristotle and Leibnitz as members. But Descartes was also a proponent of **dualism**. He held that there is a part of the human mind (or soul or spirit) that is outside of nature, exempt from physical laws. Animals, on the other hand, did not possess this dual quality; MATERIALISM they could be treated as machines. An alternative to dualism is **materialism**, which holds that the brain’s operation according to the laws of physics *constitutes* the mind. Free will is

simply the way that the perception of available choices appears to the choosing entity. Given a physical mind that manipulates knowledge, the next problem is to establish EMPIRICISM the source of knowledge. The **empiricism** movement, starting with Francis Bacon’s (1561– 1626) *Novum Organum*,2is characterized by a dictum of John Locke (1632–1704): “Nothing is in the understanding, which was not first in the senses.” David Hume’s (1711–1776) *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Hume, 1739) proposed what is now known as the principle of INDUCTION **induction**: that general rules are acquired by exposure to repeated associations between their elements. Building on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), the famous Vienna Circle, led by Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), developed the LOGICAL POSITIVISM doctrine of **logical positivism**. This doctrine holds that all knowledge can be characterized by logical theories connected, ultimately, to **observation sentences** that correspond to sensory OBSERVATION

SENTENCES

inputs; thus logical positivism combines rationalism and empiricism.3 The **confirmation the**

**ory** of Carnap and Carl Hempel (1905–1997) attempted to analyze the acquisition of knowl- CONFIRMATION THEORYedge from experience. Carnap’s book *The Logical Structure of the World* (1928) defined an explicit computational procedure for extracting knowledge from elementary experiences. It was probably the first theory of mind as a computational process.

2 The *Novum Organum* is an update of Aristotle’s *Organon*, or instrument of thought. Thus Aristotle can be seen as both an empiricist and a rationalist.

3In this picture, all meaningful statements can be verified or falsified either by experimentation or by analysis of the meaning of the words. Because this rules out most of metaphysics, as was the intention, logical positivism was unpopular in some circles.

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The final element in the philosophical picture of the mind is the connection between knowledge and action. This question is vital to AI because intelligence requires action as well as reasoning. Moreover, only by understanding how actions are justified can we understand how to build an agent whose actions are justifiable (or rational). Aristotle argued (in *De Motu Animalium*) that actions are justified by a logical connection between goals and knowledge of the action’s outcome (the last part of this extract also appears on the front cover of this book, in the original Greek):

But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition . . . whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action. . . . I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the “I have to make a cloak,” is an action.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book III. 3, 1112b), Aristotle further elaborates on this topic, suggesting an algorithm:

We deliberate not about ends, but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, . . . They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is attained, and if it seems easily and best produced thereby; while if it is achieved by one means only they consider *how* it will be achieved by this and by what means *this* will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, . . . and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming. And if we come on an impossibility, we give up the search, e.g., if we need money and this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do it.

Aristotle’s algorithm was implemented 2300 years later by Newell and Simon in their GPS program. We would now call it a regression planning system (see Chapter 10).

Goal-based analysis is useful, but does not say what to do when several actions will achieve the goal or when no action will achieve it completely. Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694) correctly described a quantitative formula for deciding what action to take in cases like this (see Chapter 16). John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) book *Utilitarianism* (Mill, 1863) promoted the idea of rational decision criteria in all spheres of human activity. The more formal theory of decisions is discussed in the following section.

**1.2.2 Mathematics**

• What are the formal rules to draw valid conclusions?

• What can be computed?

• How do we reason with uncertain information?

Philosophers staked out some of the fundamental ideas of AI, but the leap to a formal science required a level of mathematical formalization in three fundamental areas: logic, computa tion, and probability.

The idea of formal logic can be traced back to the philosophers of ancient Greece, but its mathematical development really began with the work of George Boole (1815–1864), who

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worked out the details of propositional, or Boolean, logic (Boole, 1847). In 1879, Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) extended Boole’s logic to include objects and relations, creating the first order logic that is used today.4 Alfred Tarski (1902–1983) introduced a theory of reference that shows how to relate the objects in a logic to objects in the real world.

The next step was to determine the limits of what could be done with logic and com ALGORITHM putation. The first nontrivial **algorithm** is thought to be Euclid’s algorithm for computing greatest common divisors. The word *algorithm* (and the idea of studying them) comes from al-Khowarazmi, a Persian mathematician of the 9th century, whose writings also introduced Arabic numerals and algebra to Europe. Boole and others discussed algorithms for logical deduction, and, by the late 19th century, efforts were under way to formalize general mathe matical reasoning as logical deduction. In 1930, Kurt G¨odel (1906–1978) showed that there exists an effective procedure to prove any true statement in the first-order logic of Frege and Russell, but that first-order logic could not capture the principle of mathematical induction needed to characterize the natural numbers. In 1931, G¨odel showed that limits on deduc tion do exist. His **incompleteness theorem** showed that in any formal theory as strong as INCOMPLETENESS

THEOREM

Peano arithmetic (the elementary theory of natural numbers), there are true statements that are undecidable in the sense that they have no proof within the theory.

This fundamental result can also be interpreted as showing that some functions on the integers cannot be represented by an algorithm—that is, they cannot be computed. This motivated Alan Turing (1912–1954) to try to characterize exactly which functions *are* **com**

COMPUTABLE **putable**—capable of being computed. This notion is actually slightly problematic because the notion of a computation or effective procedure really cannot be given a formal definition. However, the Church–Turing thesis, which states that the Turing machine (Turing, 1936) is capable of computing any computable function, is generally accepted as providing a sufficient definition. Turing also showed that there were some functions that no Turing machine can compute. For example, no machine can tell *in general* whether a given program will return an answer on a given input or run forever.

Although decidability and computability are important to an understanding of computa TRACTABILITY tion, the notion of **tractability** has had an even greater impact. Roughly speaking, a problem is called intractable if the time required to solve instances of the problem grows exponentially with the size of the instances. The distinction between polynomial and exponential growth in complexity was first emphasized in the mid-1960s (Cobham, 1964; Edmonds, 1965). It is important because exponential growth means that even moderately large instances cannot be solved in any reasonable time. Therefore, one should strive to divide the overall problem of

generating intelligent behavior into tractable subproblems rather than intractable ones. NP-COMPLETENESS How can one recognize an intractable problem? The theory of **NP-completeness**, pio neered by Steven Cook (1971) and Richard Karp (1972), provides a method. Cook and Karp showed the existence of large classes of canonical combinatorial search and reasoning prob lems that are NP-complete. Any problem class to which the class of NP-complete problems can be reduced is likely to be intractable. (Although it has not been proved that NP-complete

4 Frege’s proposed notation for first-order logic—an arcane combination of textual and geometric features— never became popular.

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problems are necessarily intractable, most theoreticians believe it.) These results contrast with the optimism with which the popular press greeted the first computers—“Electronic Super-Brains” that were “Faster than Einstein!” Despite the increasing speed of computers, careful use of resources will characterize intelligent systems. Put crudely, the world is an *extremely* large problem instance! Work in AI has helped explain why some instances of NP-complete problems are hard, yet others are easy (Cheeseman *et al.*, 1991).

Besides logic and computation, the third great contribution of mathematics to AI is the PROBABILITY theory of **probability**. The Italian Gerolamo Cardano (1501–1576) first framed the idea of probability, describing it in terms of the possible outcomes of gambling events. In 1654, Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), in a letter to Pierre Fermat (1601–1665), showed how to pre dict the future of an unfinished gambling game and assign average payoffs to the gamblers. Probability quickly became an invaluable part of all the quantitative sciences, helping to deal with uncertain measurements and incomplete theories. James Bernoulli (1654–1705), Pierre Laplace (1749–1827), and others advanced the theory and introduced new statistical meth ods. Thomas Bayes (1702–1761), who appears on the front cover of this book, proposed a rule for updating probabilities in the light of new evidence. Bayes’ rule underlies most modern approaches to uncertain reasoning in AI systems.

**1.2.3 Economics**

• How should we make decisions so as to maximize payoff?

• How should we do this when others may not go along?

• How should we do this when the payoff may be far in the future?

The science of economics got its start in 1776, when Scottish philosopher Adam Smith (1723–1790) published *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. While the ancient Greeks and others had made contributions to economic thought, Smith was the first to treat it as a science, using the idea that economies can be thought of as consist ing of individual agents maximizing their own economic well-being. Most people think of economics as being about money, but economists will say that they are really studying how people make choices that lead to preferred outcomes. When McDonald’s offers a hamburger for a dollar, they are asserting that they would prefer the dollar and hoping that customers will

UTILITY prefer the hamburger. The mathematical treatment of “preferred outcomes” or **utility** was first formalized by L´eon Walras (pronounced “Valrasse”) (1834-1910) and was improved by Frank Ramsey (1931) and later by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their book *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1944).

DECISION THEORY **Decision theory**, which combines probability theory with utility theory, provides a for mal and complete framework for decisions (economic or otherwise) made under uncertainty— that is, in cases where probabilistic descriptions appropriately capture the decision maker’s environment. This is suitable for “large” economies where each agent need pay no attention to the actions of other agents as individuals. For “small” economies, the situation is much more like a **game**: the actions of one player can significantly affect the utility of another (either positively or negatively). Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s development of **game** GAME THEORY **theory** (see also Luce and Raiffa, 1957) included the surprising result that, for some games,

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a rational agent should adopt policies that are (or least appear to be) randomized. Unlike de cision theory, game theory does not offer an unambiguous prescription for selecting actions. For the most part, economists did not address the third question listed above, namely, how to make rational decisions when payoffs from actions are not immediate but instead re sult from several actions taken *in sequence*. This topic was pursued in the field of **operations research**, which emerged in World War II from efforts in Britain to optimize radar installa- OPERATIONS RESEARCHtions, and later found civilian applications in complex management decisions. The work of Richard Bellman (1957) formalized a class of sequential decision problems called **Markov decision processes**, which we study in Chapters 17 and 21.

Work in economics and operations research has contributed much to our notion of ra tional agents, yet for many years AI research developed along entirely separate paths. One reason was the apparent complexity of making rational decisions. The pioneering AI re searcher Herbert Simon (1916–2001) won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1978 for his early

SATISFICING work showing that models based on **satisficing**—making decisions that are “good enough,” rather than laboriously calculating an optimal decision—gave a better description of actual human behavior (Simon, 1947). Since the 1990s, there has been a resurgence of interest in decision-theoretic techniques for agent systems (Wellman, 1995).

**1.2.4 Neuroscience**

• How do brains process information?

NEUROSCIENCE **Neuroscience** is the study of the nervous system, particularly the brain. Although the exact way in which the brain enables thought is one of the great mysteries of science, the fact that it *does* enable thought has been appreciated for thousands of years because of the evidence that strong blows to the head can lead to mental incapacitation. It has also long been known that human brains are somehow different; in about 335 B.C. Aristotle wrote, “Of all the animals, man has the largest brain in proportion to his size.”5 Still, it was not until the middle of the 18th century that the brain was widely recognized as the seat of consciousness. Before then, candidate locations included the heart and the spleen.

Paul Broca’s (1824–1880) study of aphasia (speech deficit) in brain-damaged patients in 1861 demonstrated the existence of localized areas of the brain responsible for specific cognitive functions. In particular, he showed that speech production was localized to the portion of the left hemisphere now called Broca’s area.6 By that time, it was known that

NEURON the brain consisted of nerve cells, or **neurons**, but it was not until 1873 that Camillo Golgi (1843–1926) developed a staining technique allowing the observation of individual neurons in the brain (see Figure 1.2). This technique was used by Santiago Ramon y Cajal (1852– 1934) in his pioneering studies of the brain’s neuronal structures.7 Nicolas Rashevsky (1936, 1938) was the first to apply mathematical models to the study of the nervous sytem.

5 Since then, it has been discovered that the tree shrew (*Scandentia*) has a higher ratio of brain to body mass. 6 Many cite Alexander Hood (1824) as a possible prior source.

7 Golgi persisted in his belief that the brain’s functions were carried out primarily in a continuous medium in which neurons were embedded, whereas Cajal propounded the “neuronal doctrine.” The two shared the Nobel prize in 1906 but gave mutually antagonistic acceptance speeches.

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Axonal arborization

Axon from another cell

Synapse

Dendrite

Synapses

Cell body or Soma

Axon

Nucleus

**Figure 1.2** The parts of a nerve cell or neuron. Each neuron consists of a cell body, or soma, that contains a cell nucleus. Branching out from the cell body are a number of fibers called dendrites and a single long fiber called the axon. The axon stretches out for a long distance, much longer than the scale in this diagram indicates. Typically, an axon is 1 cm long (100 times the diameter of the cell body), but can reach up to 1 meter. A neuron makes connections with 10 to 100,000 other neurons at junctions called synapses. Signals are propagated from neuron to neuron by a complicated electrochemical reaction. The signals control brain activity in the short term and also enable long-term changes in the connectivity of neurons. These mechanisms are thought to form the basis for learning in the brain. Most information processing goes on in the cerebral cortex, the outer layer of the brain. The basic organizational unit appears to be a column of tissue about 0.5 mm in diameter, containing about 20,000 neurons and extending the full depth of the cortex about 4 mm in humans). 



We now have some data on the mapping between areas of the brain and the parts of the body that they control or from which they receive sensory input. Such mappings are able to change radically over the course of a few weeks, and some animals seem to have multiple maps. Moreover, we do not fully understand how other areas can take over functions when one area is damaged. There is almost no theory on how an individual memory is stored.

The measurement of intact brain activity began in 1929 with the invention by Hans Berger of the electroencephalograph (EEG). The recent development of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Ogawa *et al.*, 1990; Cabeza and Nyberg, 2001) is giving neu roscientists unprecedentedly detailed images of brain activity, enabling measurements that correspond in interesting ways to ongoing cognitive processes. These are augmented by advances in single-cell recording of neuron activity. Individual neurons can be stimulated electrically, chemically, or even optically (Han and Boyden, 2007), allowing neuronal input– output relationships to be mapped. Despite these advances, we are still a long way from understanding how cognitive processes actually work.

The truly amazing conclusion is that *a collection of simple cells can lead to thought, action, and consciousness* or, in the pithy words of John Searle (1992), *brains cause minds*.

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Supercomputer Personal Computer Human Brain 

Computational units 104 CPUs, 1012 transistors 4 CPUs, 109transistors 1011 neurons Storage units 1014 bits RAM 1011 bits RAM 1011 neurons 1015 bits disk 1013 bits disk 1014 synapses 

Cycle time 10−9sec 10−9sec 10−3sec Operations/sec 1015 1010 1017 

Memory updates/sec 1014 1010 1014 



**Figure 1.3** A crude comparison of the raw computational resources available to the IBM BLUE GENE supercomputer, a typical personal computer of 2008, and the human brain. The brain’s numbers are essentially fixed, whereas the supercomputer’s numbers have been in creasing by a factor of 10 every 5 years or so, allowing it to achieve rough parity with the brain. The personal computer lags behind on all metrics except cycle time.



The only real alternative theory is mysticism: that minds operate in some mystical realm that is beyond physical science.

Brains and digital computers have somewhat different properties. Figure 1.3 shows that computers have a cycle time that is a million times faster than a brain. The brain makes up for that with far more storage and interconnection than even a high-end personal computer, although the largest supercomputers have a capacity that is similar to the brain’s. (It should be noted, however, that the brain does not seem to use all of its neurons simultaneously.)

SINGULARITY Futurists make much of these numbers, pointing to an approaching **singularity** at which computers reach a superhuman level of performance (Vinge, 1993; Kurzweil, 2005), but the raw comparisons are not especially informative. Even with a computer of virtually unlimited capacity, we still would not know how to achieve the brain’s level of intelligence.

**1.2.5 Psychology**

• How do humans and animals think and act?

The origins of scientific psychology are usually traced to the work of the German physi cist Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) and his student Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920). Helmholtz applied the scientific method to the study of human vision, and his *Handbook of Physiological Optics* is even now described as “the single most important treatise on the physics and physiology of human vision” (Nalwa, 1993, p.15). In 1879, Wundt opened the first laboratory of experimental psychology, at the University of Leipzig. Wundt insisted on carefully controlled experiments in which his workers would perform a perceptual or as sociative task while introspecting on their thought processes. The careful controls went a long way toward making psychology a science, but the subjective nature of the data made it unlikely that an experimenter would ever disconfirm his or her own theories. Biologists studying animal behavior, on the other hand, lacked introspective data and developed an ob jective methodology, as described by H. S. Jennings (1906) in his influential work *Behavior of*

BEHAVIORISM *the Lower Organisms*. Applying this viewpoint to humans, the **behaviorism** movement, led by John Watson (1878–1958), rejected *any* theory involving mental processes on the grounds

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that introspection could not provide reliable evidence. Behaviorists insisted on studying only objective measures of the percepts (or *stimulus*) given to an animal and its resulting actions (or *response*). Behaviorism discovered a lot about rats and pigeons but had less success at understanding humans.

**Cognitive psychology**, which views the brain as an information-processing device, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGYcan be traced back at least to the works of William James (1842–1910). Helmholtz also insisted that perception involved a form of unconscious logical inference. The cognitive viewpoint was largely eclipsed by behaviorism in the United States, but at Cambridge’s Ap plied Psychology Unit, directed by Frederic Bartlett (1886–1969), cognitive modeling was able to flourish. *The Nature of Explanation*, by Bartlett’s student and successor Kenneth Craik (1943), forcefully reestablished the legitimacy of such “mental” terms as beliefs and goals, arguing that they are just as scientific as, say, using pressure and temperature to talk about gases, despite their being made of molecules that have neither. Craik specified the three key steps of a knowledge-based agent: (1) the stimulus must be translated into an inter nal representation, (2) the representation is manipulated by cognitive processes to derive new internal representations, and (3) these are in turn retranslated back into action. He clearly explained why this was a good design for an agent:

If the organism carries a “small-scale model” of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations before they arise, utilize the knowledge of past events in dealing with the present and future, and in every way to react in a much fuller, safer, and more competent manner to the emergencies which face it. (Craik, 1943)

After Craik’s death in a bicycle accident in 1945, his work was continued by Donald Broad bent, whose book *Perception and Communication* (1958) was one of the first works to model psychological phenomena as information processing. Meanwhile, in the United States, the development of computer modeling led to the creation of the field of **cognitive science**. The field can be said to have started at a workshop in September 1956 at MIT. (We shall see that this is just two months after the conference at which AI itself was “born.”) At the workshop, George Miller presented *The Magic Number Seven*, Noam Chomsky presented *Three Models of Language*, and Allen Newell and Herbert Simon presented *The Logic Theory Machine*. These three influential papers showed how computer models could be used to address the psychology of memory, language, and logical thinking, respectively. It is now a common (although far from universal) view among psychologists that “a cognitive theory should be like a computer program” (Anderson, 1980); that is, it should describe a detailed information processing mechanism whereby some cognitive function might be implemented.

**1.2.6 Computer engineering**

• How can we build an efficient computer?

For artificial intelligence to succeed, we need two things: intelligence and an artifact. The computer has been the artifact of choice. The modern digital electronic computer was in vented independently and almost simultaneously by scientists in three countries embattled in

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World War II. The first *operational* computer was the electromechanical Heath Robinson,8 built in 1940 by Alan Turing’s team for a single purpose: deciphering German messages. In 1943, the same group developed the Colossus, a powerful general-purpose machine based on vacuum tubes.9 The first operational *programmable* computer was the Z-3, the inven tion of Konrad Zuse in Germany in 1941. Zuse also invented floating-point numbers and the first high-level programming language, Plankalk¨ul. The first *electronic* computer, the ABC, was assembled by John Atanasoff and his student Clifford Berry between 1940 and 1942 at Iowa State University. Atanasoff’s research received little support or recognition; it was the ENIAC, developed as part of a secret military project at the University of Pennsylvania by a team including John Mauchly and John Eckert, that proved to be the most influential forerunner of modern computers.

Since that time, each generation of computer hardware has brought an increase in speed and capacity and a decrease in price. Performance doubled every 18 months or so until around 2005, when power dissipation problems led manufacturers to start multiplying the number of CPU cores rather than the clock speed. Current expectations are that future increases in power will come from massive parallelism—a curious convergence with the properties of the brain.

Of course, there were calculating devices before the electronic computer. The earliest automated machines, dating from the 17th century, were discussed on page 6. The first *pro grammable* machine was a loom, devised in 1805 by Joseph Marie Jacquard (1752–1834), that used punched cards to store instructions for the pattern to be woven. In the mid-19th century, Charles Babbage (1792–1871) designed two machines, neither of which he com pleted. The Difference Engine was intended to compute mathematical tables for engineering and scientific projects. It was finally built and shown to work in 1991 at the Science Museum in London (Swade, 2000). Babbage’s Analytical Engine was far more ambitious: it included addressable memory, stored programs, and conditional jumps and was the first artifact capa ble of universal computation. Babbage’s colleague Ada Lovelace, daughter of the poet Lord Byron, was perhaps the world’s first programmer. (The programming language Ada is named after her.) She wrote programs for the unfinished Analytical Engine and even speculated that the machine could play chess or compose music.

AI also owes a debt to the software side of computer science, which has supplied the operating systems, programming languages, and tools needed to write modern programs (and papers about them). But this is one area where the debt has been repaid: work in AI has pio neered many ideas that have made their way back to mainstream computer science, including time sharing, interactive interpreters, personal computers with windows and mice, rapid de velopment environments, the linked list data type, automatic storage management, and key concepts of symbolic, functional, declarative, and object-oriented programming.

8 Heath Robinson was a cartoonist famous for his depictions of whimsical and absurdly complicated contrap tions for everyday tasks such as buttering toast.

9In the postwar period, Turing wanted to use these computers for AI research—for example, one of the first chess programs (Turing *et al.*, 1953). His efforts were blocked by the British government.

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**1.2.7 Control theory and cybernetics**

• How can artifacts operate under their own control?

Ktesibios of Alexandria (c. 250 B.C.) built the first self-controlling machine: a water clock with a regulator that maintained a constant flow rate. This invention changed the definition of what an artifact could do. Previously, only living things could modify their behavior in response to changes in the environment. Other examples of self-regulating feedback control systems include the steam engine governor, created by James Watt (1736–1819), and the thermostat, invented by Cornelis Drebbel (1572–1633), who also invented the submarine. The mathematical theory of stable feedback systems was developed in the 19th century.

CONTROL THEORY The central figure in the creation of what is now called **control theory** was Norbert Wiener (1894–1964). Wiener was a brilliant mathematician who worked with Bertrand Rus sell, among others, before developing an interest in biological and mechanical control systems and their connection to cognition. Like Craik (who also used control systems as psychological models), Wiener and his colleagues Arturo Rosenblueth and Julian Bigelow challenged the behaviorist orthodoxy (Rosenblueth *et al.*, 1943). They viewed purposive behavior as aris ing from a regulatory mechanism trying to minimize “error”—the difference between current state and goal state. In the late 1940s, Wiener, along with Warren McCulloch, Walter Pitts, and John von Neumann, organized a series of influential conferences that explored the new

CYBERNETICS mathematical and computational models of cognition. Wiener’s book *Cybernetics* (1948) be came a bestseller and awoke the public to the possibility of artificially intelligent machines. Meanwhile, in Britain, W. Ross Ashby (Ashby, 1940) pioneered similar ideas. Ashby, Alan Turing, Grey Walter, and others formed the Ratio Club for “those who had Wiener’s ideas before Wiener’s book appeared.” Ashby’s *Design for a Brain* (1948, 1952) elaborated on his

HOMEOSTATIC idea that intelligence could be created by the use of **homeostatic** devices containing appro priate feedback loops to achieve stable adaptive behavior.

Modern control theory, especially the branch known as stochastic optimal control, has as its goal the design of systems that maximize an **objective function** over time. This roughly OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONmatches our view of AI: designing systems that behave optimally. Why, then, are AI and

control theory two different fields, despite the close connections among their founders? The answer lies in the close coupling between the mathematical techniques that were familiar to the participants and the corresponding sets of problems that were encompassed in each world view. Calculus and matrix algebra, the tools of control theory, lend themselves to systems that are describable by fixed sets of continuous variables, whereas AI was founded in part as a way to escape from the these perceived limitations. The tools of logical inference and computation allowed AI researchers to consider problems such as language, vision, and planning that fell completely outside the control theorist’s purview.

**1.2.8 Linguistics**

• How does language relate to thought?

In 1957, B. F. Skinner published *Verbal Behavior*. This was a comprehensive, detailed ac count of the behaviorist approach to language learning, written by the foremost expert in

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the field. But curiously, a review of the book became as well known as the book itself, and served to almost kill off interest in behaviorism. The author of the review was the linguist Noam Chomsky, who had just published a book on his own theory, *Syntactic Structures*. Chomsky pointed out that the behaviorist theory did not address the notion of creativity in language—it did not explain how a child could understand and make up sentences that he or she had never heard before. Chomsky’s theory—based on syntactic models going back to the Indian linguist Panini (c. 350 B.C.)—could explain this, and unlike previous theories, it was formal enough that it could in principle be programmed.

Modern linguistics and AI, then, were “born” at about the same time, and grew up together, intersecting in a hybrid field called **computational linguistics** or **natural language** COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS**processing**. The problem of understanding language soon turned out to be considerably more

complex than it seemed in 1957. Understanding language requires an understanding of the subject matter and context, not just an understanding of the structure of sentences. This might seem obvious, but it was not widely appreciated until the 1960s. Much of the early work in **knowledge representation** (the study of how to put knowledge into a form that a computer can reason with) was tied to language and informed by research in linguistics, which was connected in turn to decades of work on the philosophical analysis of language.

1.3 THE HISTORY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE



With the background material behind us, we are ready to cover the development of AI itself. **1.3.1 The gestation of artificial intelligence (1943–1955)**

The first work that is now generally recognized as AI was done by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts (1943). They drew on three sources: knowledge of the basic physiology and function of neurons in the brain; a formal analysis of propositional logic due to Russell and Whitehead; and Turing’s theory of computation. They proposed a model of artificial neurons in which each neuron is characterized as being “on” or “off,” with a switch to “on” occurring in response to stimulation by a sufficient number of neighboring neurons. The state of a neuron was conceived of as “factually equivalent to a proposition which proposed its adequate stimulus.” They showed, for example, that any computable function could be computed by some network of connected neurons, and that all the logical connectives (and, or, not, etc.) could be implemented by simple net structures. McCulloch and Pitts also suggested that suitably defined networks could learn. Donald Hebb (1949) demonstrated a simple updating rule for modifying the connection strengths between neurons. His rule, now called **Hebbian** HEBBIAN LEARNING **learning**, remains an influential model to this day.

Two undergraduate students at Harvard, Marvin Minsky and Dean Edmonds, built the first neural network computer in 1950. The SNARC, as it was called, used 3000 vacuum tubes and a surplus automatic pilot mechanism from a B-24 bomber to simulate a network of 40 neurons. Later, at Princeton, Minsky studied universal computation in neural networks. His Ph.D. committee was skeptical about whether this kind of work should be considered

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mathematics, but von Neumann reportedly said, “If it isn’t now, it will be someday.” Minsky was later to prove influential theorems showing the limitations of neural network research. There were a number of early examples of work that can be characterized as AI, but Alan Turing’s vision was perhaps the most influential. He gave lectures on the topic as early as 1947 at the London Mathematical Society and articulated a persuasive agenda in his 1950 article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Therein, he introduced the Turing Test, machine learning, genetic algorithms, and reinforcement learning. He proposed the *Child Programme* idea, explaining “Instead of trying to produce a programme to simulate the adult mind, why not rather try to produce one which simulated the child’s?”

**1.3.2 The birth of artificial intelligence (1956)**

Princeton was home to another influential figure in AI, John McCarthy. After receiving his PhD there in 1951 and working for two years as an instructor, McCarthy moved to Stan ford and then to Dartmouth College, which was to become the official birthplace of the field. McCarthy convinced Minsky, Claude Shannon, and Nathaniel Rochester to help him bring together U.S. researchers interested in automata theory, neural nets, and the study of intel ligence. They organized a two-month workshop at Dartmouth in the summer of 1956. The proposal states:10

We propose that a 2 month, 10 man study of artificial intelligence be carried

out during the summer of 1956 at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hamp shire. The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely de scribed that a machine can be made to simulate it. An attempt will be made to find how to make machines use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved for humans, and improve themselves. We think that a significant advance can be made in one or more of these problems if a carefully selected group of scientists work on it together for a summer.

There were 10 attendees in all, including Trenchard More from Princeton, Arthur Samuel from IBM, and Ray Solomonoff and Oliver Selfridge from MIT.

Two researchers from Carnegie Tech,11 Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, rather stole the show. Although the others had ideas and in some cases programs for particular appli cations such as checkers, Newell and Simon already had a reasoning program, the Logic Theorist (LT), about which Simon claimed, “We have invented a computer program capable of thinking non-numerically, and thereby solved the venerable mind–body problem.”12 Soon after the workshop, the program was able to prove most of the theorems in Chapter 2 of Rus

10 This was the first official usage of McCarthy’s term *artificial intelligence*. Perhaps “computational rationality” would have been more precise and less threatening, but “AI” has stuck. At the 50th anniversary of the Dartmouth conference, McCarthy stated that he resisted the terms “computer” or “computational” in deference to Norbert Weiner, who was promoting analog cybernetic devices rather than digital computers.

11 Now Carnegie Mellon University (CMU).

12 Newell and Simon also invented a list-processing language, IPL, to write LT. They had no compiler and translated it into machine code by hand. To avoid errors, they worked in parallel, calling out binary numbers to each other as they wrote each instruction to make sure they agreed.

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sell and Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematica*. Russell was reportedly delighted when Simon showed him that the program had come up with a proof for one theorem that was shorter than the one in *Principia*. The editors of the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* were less impressed; they rejected a paper coauthored by Newell, Simon, and Logic Theorist.

The Dartmouth workshop did not lead to any new breakthroughs, but it did introduce all the major figures to each other. For the next 20 years, the field would be dominated by these people and their students and colleagues at MIT, CMU, Stanford, and IBM.

Looking at the proposal for the Dartmouth workshop (McCarthy *et al.*, 1955), we can see why it was necessary for AI to become a separate field. Why couldn’t all the work done in AI have taken place under the name of control theory or operations research or decision theory, which, after all, have objectives similar to those of AI? Or why isn’t AI a branch of mathematics? The first answer is that AI from the start embraced the idea of duplicating human faculties such as creativity, self-improvement, and language use. None of the other fields were addressing these issues. The second answer is methodology. AI is the only one of these fields that is clearly a branch of computer science (although operations research does share an emphasis on computer simulations), and AI is the only field to attempt to build machines that will function autonomously in complex, changing environments.

**1.3.3 Early enthusiasm, great expectations (1952–1969)**

The early years of AI were full of successes—in a limited way. Given the primitive comput ers and programming tools of the time and the fact that only a few years earlier computers were seen as things that could do arithmetic and no more, it was astonishing whenever a com puter did anything remotely clever. The intellectual establishment, by and large, preferred to believe that “a machine can never do X.” (See Chapter 26 for a long list of X’s gathered by Turing.) AI researchers naturally responded by demonstrating one X after another. John McCarthy referred to this period as the “Look, Ma, no hands!” era.

Newell and Simon’s early success was followed up with the General Problem Solver, or GPS. Unlike Logic Theorist, this program was designed from the start to imitate human problem-solving protocols. Within the limited class of puzzles it could handle, it turned out that the order in which the program considered subgoals and possible actions was similar to that in which humans approached the same problems. Thus, GPS was probably the first pro gram to embody the “thinking humanly” approach. The success of GPS and subsequent pro grams as models of cognition led Newell and Simon (1976) to formulate the famous **physical**

**symbol system** hypothesis, which states that “a physical symbol system has the necessary and PHYSICAL SYMBOL SYSTEMsufficient means for general intelligent action.” What they meant is that any system (human or machine) exhibiting intelligence must operate by manipulating data structures composed of symbols. We will see later that this hypothesis has been challenged from many directions. At IBM, Nathaniel Rochester and his colleagues produced some of the first AI pro grams. Herbert Gelernter (1959) constructed the Geometry Theorem Prover, which was able to prove theorems that many students of mathematics would find quite tricky. Starting in 1952, Arthur Samuel wrote a series of programs for checkers (draughts) that eventually learned to play at a strong amateur level. Along the way, he disproved the idea that comput-

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ers can do only what they are told to: his program quickly learned to play a better game than its creator. The program was demonstrated on television in February 1956, creating a strong impression. Like Turing, Samuel had trouble finding computer time. Working at night, he used machines that were still on the testing floor at IBM’s manufacturing plant. Chapter 5 covers game playing, and Chapter 21 explains the learning techniques used by Samuel.

John McCarthy moved from Dartmouth to MIT and there made three crucial contribu tions in one historic year: 1958. In MIT AI Lab Memo No. 1, McCarthy defined the high-level LISP language **Lisp**, which was to become the dominant AI programming language for the next 30 years. With Lisp, McCarthy had the tool he needed, but access to scarce and expensive com puting resources was also a serious problem. In response, he and others at MIT invented time sharing. Also in 1958, McCarthy published a paper entitled *Programs with Common Sense*, in which he described the Advice Taker, a hypothetical program that can be seen as the first complete AI system. Like the Logic Theorist and Geometry Theorem Prover, McCarthy’s program was designed to use knowledge to search for solutions to problems. But unlike the others, it was to embody general knowledge of the world. For example, he showed how some simple axioms would enable the program to generate a plan to drive to the airport. The program was also designed to accept new axioms in the normal course of operation, thereby allowing it to achieve competence in new areas *without being reprogrammed*. The Advice Taker thus embodied the central principles of knowledge representation and reasoning: that it is useful to have a formal, explicit representation of the world and its workings and to be able to manipulate that representation with deductive processes. It is remarkable how much of the 1958 paper remains relevant today.

1958 also marked the year that Marvin Minsky moved to MIT. His initial collaboration with McCarthy did not last, however. McCarthy stressed representation and reasoning in for mal logic, whereas Minsky was more interested in getting programs to work and eventually developed an anti-logic outlook. In 1963, McCarthy started the AI lab at Stanford. His plan to use logic to build the ultimate Advice Taker was advanced by J. A. Robinson’s discov ery in 1965 of the resolution method (a complete theorem-proving algorithm for first-order logic; see Chapter 9). Work at Stanford emphasized general-purpose methods for logical reasoning. Applications of logic included Cordell Green’s question-answering and planning systems (Green, 1969b) and the Shakey robotics project at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI). The latter project, discussed further in Chapter 25, was the first to demonstrate the complete integration of logical reasoning and physical activity.

Minsky supervised a series of students who chose limited problems that appeared to MICROWORLD require intelligence to solve. These limited domains became known as **microworlds**. James Slagle’s SAINT program (1963) was able to solve closed-form calculus integration problems typical of first-year college courses. Tom Evans’s ANALOGY program (1968) solved geo metric analogy problems that appear in IQ tests. Daniel Bobrow’s STUDENT program (1967) solved algebra story problems, such as the following:

If the number of customers Tom gets is twice the square of 20 percent of the number of advertisements he runs, and the number of advertisements he runs is 45, what is the number of customers Tom gets?

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**Blue**

**Red**

**Green**

Green

**Red**

**Red**

**Green**

**Blue**

**Figure 1.4** A scene from the blocks world. SHRDLU (Winograd, 1972) has just completed the command “Find a block which is taller than the one you are holding and put it in the box.” 



The most famous microworld was the blocks world, which consists of a set of solid blocks placed on a tabletop (or more often, a simulation of a tabletop), as shown in Figure 1.4. A typical task in this world is to rearrange the blocks in a certain way, using a robot hand that can pick up one block at a time. The blocks world was home to the vision project of David Huffman (1971), the vision and constraint-propagation work of David Waltz (1975), the learning theory of Patrick Winston (1970), the natural-language-understanding program of Terry Winograd (1972), and the planner of Scott Fahlman (1974).

Early work building on the neural networks of McCulloch and Pitts also flourished. The work of Winograd and Cowan (1963) showed how a large number of elements could collectively represent an individual concept, with a corresponding increase in robustness and parallelism. Hebb’s learning methods were enhanced by Bernie Widrow (Widrow and Hoff, 1960; Widrow, 1962), who called his networks **adalines**, and by Frank Rosenblatt (1962) with his **perceptrons**. The **perceptron convergence theorem** (Block *et al.*, 1962) says that the learning algorithm can adjust the connection strengths of a perceptron to match any input data, provided such a match exists. These topics are covered in Chapter 20.

**1.3.4 A dose of reality (1966–1973)**

From the beginning, AI researchers were not shy about making predictions of their coming successes. The following statement by Herbert Simon in 1957 is often quoted:

It is not my aim to surprise or shock you—but the simplest way I can summarize is to say that there are now in the world machines that think, that learn and that create. Moreover,

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their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until—in a visible future—the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied.

Terms such as “visible future” can be interpreted in various ways, but Simon also made more concrete predictions: that within 10 years a computer would be chess champion, and a significant mathematical theorem would be proved by machine. These predictions came true (or approximately true) within 40 years rather than 10. Simon’s overconfidence was due to the promising performance of early AI systems on simple examples. In almost all cases, however, these early systems turned out to fail miserably when tried out on wider selections of problems and on more difficult problems.

The first kind of difficulty arose because most early programs knew nothing of their subject matter; they succeeded by means of simple syntactic manipulations. A typical story occurred in early machine translation efforts, which were generously funded by the U.S. Na tional Research Council in an attempt to speed up the translation of Russian scientific papers in the wake of the Sputnik launch in 1957. It was thought initially that simple syntactic trans formations based on the grammars of Russian and English, and word replacement from an electronic dictionary, would suffice to preserve the exact meanings of sentences. The fact is that accurate translation requires background knowledge in order to resolve ambiguity and establish the content of the sentence. The famous retranslation of “the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak” as “the vodka is good but the meat is rotten” illustrates the difficulties en countered. In 1966, a report by an advisory committee found that “there has been no machine translation of general scientific text, and none is in immediate prospect.” All U.S. government funding for academic translation projects was canceled. Today, machine translation is an im perfect but widely used tool for technical, commercial, government, and Internet documents.

The second kind of difficulty was the intractability of many of the problems that AI was attempting to solve. Most of the early AI programs solved problems by trying out different combinations of steps until the solution was found. This strategy worked initially because microworlds contained very few objects and hence very few possible actions and very short solution sequences. Before the theory of computational complexity was developed, it was widely thought that “scaling up” to larger problems was simply a matter of faster hardware and larger memories. The optimism that accompanied the development of resolution theorem proving, for example, was soon dampened when researchers failed to prove theorems involv ing more than a few dozen facts. *The fact that a program can find a solution in principle does not mean that the program contains any of the mechanisms needed to find it in practice.*

The illusion of unlimited computational power was not confined to problem-solving MACHINE EVOLUTION programs. Early experiments in **machine evolution** (now called **genetic algorithms**) (Fried GENETIC

ALGORITHM berg, 1958; Friedberg *et al.*, 1959) were based on the undoubtedly correct belief that by making an appropriate series of small mutations to a machine-code program, one can gen erate a program with good performance for any particular task. The idea, then, was to try random mutations with a selection process to preserve mutations that seemed useful. De spite thousands of hours of CPU time, almost no progress was demonstrated. Modern genetic algorithms use better representations and have shown more success.

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Failure to come to grips with the “combinatorial explosion” was one of the main criti cisms of AI contained in the Lighthill report (Lighthill, 1973), which formed the basis for the decision by the British government to end support for AI research in all but two universities. (Oral tradition paints a somewhat different and more colorful picture, with political ambitions and personal animosities whose description is beside the point.)

A third difficulty arose because of some fundamental limitations on the basic structures being used to generate intelligent behavior. For example, Minsky and Papert’s book *Percep trons* (1969) proved that, although perceptrons (a simple form of neural network) could be shown to learn anything they were capable of representing, they could represent very little. In particular, a two-input perceptron (restricted to be simpler than the form Rosenblatt originally studied) could not be trained to recognize when its two inputs were different. Although their results did not apply to more complex, multilayer networks, research funding for neural-net research soon dwindled to almost nothing. Ironically, the new back-propagation learning al gorithms for multilayer networks that were to cause an enormous resurgence in neural-net research in the late 1980s were actually discovered first in 1969 (Bryson and Ho, 1969).

**1.3.5 Knowledge-based systems: The key to power? (1969–1979)**

The picture of problem solving that had arisen during the first decade of AI research was of a general-purpose search mechanism trying to string together elementary reasoning steps to WEAK METHOD find complete solutions. Such approaches have been called **weak methods** because, although general, they do not scale up to large or difficult problem instances. The alternative to weak methods is to use more powerful, domain-specific knowledge that allows larger reasoning steps and can more easily handle typically occurring cases in narrow areas of expertise. One

might say that to solve a hard problem, you have to almost know the answer already. The DENDRAL program (Buchanan *et al.*, 1969) was an early example of this approach. It was developed at Stanford, where Ed Feigenbaum (a former student of Herbert Simon), Bruce Buchanan (a philosopher turned computer scientist), and Joshua Lederberg (a Nobel laureate geneticist) teamed up to solve the problem of inferring molecular structure from the information provided by a mass spectrometer. The input to the program consists of the ele mentary formula of the molecule (e.g., C6H13NO2) and the mass spectrum giving the masses of the various fragments of the molecule generated when it is bombarded by an electron beam. For example, the mass spectrum might contain a peak at m = 15, corresponding to the mass of a methyl (CH3) fragment.

The naive version of the program generated all possible structures consistent with the formula, and then predicted what mass spectrum would be observed for each, comparing this with the actual spectrum. As one might expect, this is intractable for even moderate-sized molecules. The DENDRAL researchers consulted analytical chemists and found that they worked by looking for well-known patterns of peaks in the spectrum that suggested common substructures in the molecule. For example, the following rule is used to recognize a ketone (C=O) subgroup (which weighs 28):

**if** there are two peaks at x1 and x2 such that

(a) x1 + x2 = M + 28 (M is the mass of the whole molecule);

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(b) x1 − 28 is a high peak;

(c) x2 − 28 is a high peak;

(d) At least one of x1 and x2 is high.

**then** there is a ketone subgroup

Recognizing that the molecule contains a particular substructure reduces the number of pos sible candidates enormously. DENDRAL was powerful because

All the relevant theoretical knowledge to solve these problems has been mapped over from its general form in the [spectrum prediction component] (“first principles”) to efficient special forms (“cookbook recipes”). (Feigenbaum *et al.*, 1971)

The significance of DENDRAL was that it was the first successful *knowledge-intensive* sys tem: its expertise derived from large numbers of special-purpose rules. Later systems also incorporated the main theme of McCarthy’s Advice Taker approach—the clean separation of the knowledge (in the form of rules) from the reasoning component.

With this lesson in mind, Feigenbaum and others at Stanford began the Heuristic Pro gramming Project (HPP) to investigate the extent to which the new methodology of **expert** EXPERT SYSTEMS **systems** could be applied to other areas of human expertise. The next major effort was in the area of medical diagnosis. Feigenbaum, Buchanan, and Dr. Edward Shortliffe developed MYCIN to diagnose blood infections. With about 450 rules, MYCIN was able to perform as well as some experts, and considerably better than junior doctors. It also contained two major differences from DENDRAL. First, unlike the DENDRAL rules, no general theoretical model existed from which the MYCIN rules could be deduced. They had to be acquired from extensive interviewing of experts, who in turn acquired them from textbooks, other experts, and direct experience of cases. Second, the rules had to reflect the uncertainty associated with CERTAINTY FACTOR medical knowledge. MYCIN incorporated a calculus of uncertainty called **certainty factors** (see Chapter 14), which seemed (at the time) to fit well with how doctors assessed the impact of evidence on the diagnosis.

The importance of domain knowledge was also apparent in the area of understanding natural language. Although Winograd’s SHRDLU system for understanding natural language had engendered a good deal of excitement, its dependence on syntactic analysis caused some of the same problems as occurred in the early machine translation work. It was able to overcome ambiguity and understand pronoun references, but this was mainly because it was designed specifically for one area—the blocks world. Several researchers, including Eugene Charniak, a fellow graduate student of Winograd’s at MIT, suggested that robust language understanding would require general knowledge about the world and a general method for using that knowledge.

At Yale, linguist-turned-AI-researcher Roger Schank emphasized this point, claiming, “There is no such thing as syntax,” which upset a lot of linguists but did serve to start a useful discussion. Schank and his students built a series of programs (Schank and Abelson, 1977; Wilensky, 1978; Schank and Riesbeck, 1981; Dyer, 1983) that all had the task of under standing natural language. The emphasis, however, was less on language *per se* and more on the problems of representing and reasoning with the knowledge required for language under standing. The problems included representing stereotypical situations (Cullingford, 1981),

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describing human memory organization (Rieger, 1976; Kolodner, 1983), and understanding plans and goals (Wilensky, 1983).

The widespread growth of applications to real-world problems caused a concurrent in crease in the demands for workable knowledge representation schemes. A large number of different representation and reasoning languages were developed. Some were based on logic—for example, the Prolog language became popular in Europe, and the PLANNER fam

FRAMES ily in the United States. Others, following Minsky’s idea of **frames** (1975), adopted a more structured approach, assembling facts about particular object and event types and arranging the types into a large taxonomic hierarchy analogous to a biological taxonomy.

**1.3.6 AI becomes an industry (1980–present)**

The first successful commercial expert system, R1, began operation at the Digital Equipment Corporation (McDermott, 1982). The program helped configure orders for new computer systems; by 1986, it was saving the company an estimated $40 million a year. By 1988, DEC’s AI group had 40 expert systems deployed, with more on the way. DuPont had 100 in use and 500 in development, saving an estimated $10 million a year. Nearly every major U.S. corporation had its own AI group and was either using or investigating expert systems.

In 1981, the Japanese announced the “Fifth Generation” project, a 10-year plan to build intelligent computers running Prolog. In response, the United States formed the Microelec tronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) as a research consortium designed to assure national competitiveness. In both cases, AI was part of a broad effort, including chip design and human-interface research. In Britain, the Alvey report reinstated the funding that was cut by the Lighthill report.13 In all three countries, however, the projects never met their ambitious goals.

Overall, the AI industry boomed from a few million dollars in 1980 to billions of dollars in 1988, including hundreds of companies building expert systems, vision systems, robots, and software and hardware specialized for these purposes. Soon after that came a period called the “AI Winter,” in which many companies fell by the wayside as they failed to deliver on extravagant promises.

**1.3.7 The return of neural networks (1986–present)**

BACK-PROPAGATION In the mid-1980s at least four different groups reinvented the **back-propagation** learning algorithm first found in 1969 by Bryson and Ho. The algorithm was applied to many learn ing problems in computer science and psychology, and the widespread dissemination of the results in the collection *Parallel Distributed Processing* (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986) caused great excitement.

CONNECTIONIST These so-called **connectionist** models of intelligent systems were seen by some as di rect competitors both to the symbolic models promoted by Newell and Simon and to the logicist approach of McCarthy and others (Smolensky, 1988). It might seem obvious that at some level humans manipulate symbols—in fact, Terrence Deacon’s book *The Symbolic*

**13 To save embarrassment, a new field called IKBS (Intelligent Knowledge-Based Systems) was invented because Artificial Intelligence had been officially canceled.

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*Species* (1997) suggests that this is the *defining characteristic* of humans—but the most ar dent connectionists questioned whether symbol manipulation had any real explanatory role in detailed models of cognition. This question remains unanswered, but the current view is that connectionist and symbolic approaches are complementary, not competing. As occurred with the separation of AI and cognitive science, modern neural network research has bifurcated into two fields, one concerned with creating effective network architectures and algorithms and understanding their mathematical properties, the other concerned with careful modeling of the empirical properties of actual neurons and ensembles of neurons.

**1.3.8 AI adopts the scientific method (1987–present)**

Recent years have seen a revolution in both the content and the methodology of work in artificial intelligence.14 It is now more common to build on existing theories than to propose brand-new ones, to base claims on rigorous theorems or hard experimental evidence rather than on intuition, and to show relevance to real-world applications rather than toy examples.

AI was founded in part as a rebellion against the limitations of existing fields like control theory and statistics, but now it is embracing those fields. As David McAllester (1998) put it:

In the early period of AI it seemed plausible that new forms of symbolic computation, e.g., frames and semantic networks, made much of classical theory obsolete. This led to a form of isolationism in which AI became largely separated from the rest of computer science. This isolationism is currently being abandoned. There is a recognition that machine learning should not be isolated from information theory, that uncertain reasoning should not be isolated from stochastic modeling, that search should not be isolated from classical optimization and control, and that automated reasoning should not be isolated from formal methods and static analysis.

In terms of methodology, AI has finally come firmly under the scientific method. To be ac cepted, hypotheses must be subjected to rigorous empirical experiments, and the results must be analyzed statistically for their importance (Cohen, 1995). It is now possible to replicate experiments by using shared repositories of test data and code.

The field of speech recognition illustrates the pattern. In the 1970s, a wide variety of different architectures and approaches were tried. Many of these were rather *ad hoc* and fragile, and were demonstrated on only a few specially selected examples. In recent years, approaches based on **hidden Markov models** (HMMs) have come to dominate the area. Two HIDDEN MARKOV

MODELS

aspects of HMMs are relevant. First, they are based on a rigorous mathematical theory. This has allowed speech researchers to build on several decades of mathematical results developed in other fields. Second, they are generated by a process of training on a large corpus of real speech data. This ensures that the performance is robust, and in rigorous blind tests the HMMs have been improving their scores steadily. Speech technology and the related field of handwritten character recognition are already making the transition to widespread industrial

14 Some have characterized this change as a victory of the **neats**—those who think that AI theories should be grounded in mathematical rigor—over the **scruffies**—those who would rather try out lots of ideas, write some programs, and then assess what seems to be working. Both approaches are important. A shift toward neatness implies that the field has reached a level of stability and maturity. Whether that stability will be disrupted by a new scruffy idea is another question.

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and consumer applications. Note that there is no scientific claim that humans use HMMs to recognize speech; rather, HMMs provide a mathematical framework for understanding the problem and support the engineering claim that they work well in practice.

Machine translation follows the same course as speech recognition. In the 1950s there was initial enthusiasm for an approach based on sequences of words, with models learned according to the principles of information theory. That approach fell out of favor in the 1960s, but returned in the late 1990s and now dominates the field.

Neural networks also fit this trend. Much of the work on neural nets in the 1980s was done in an attempt to scope out what could be done and to learn how neural nets differ from “traditional” techniques. Using improved methodology and theoretical frameworks, the field arrived at an understanding in which neural nets can now be compared with corresponding techniques from statistics, pattern recognition, and machine learning, and the most promising technique can be applied to each application. As a result of these developments, so-called DATA MINING **data mining** technology has spawned a vigorous new industry.

Judea Pearl’s (1988) *Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems* led to a new accep tance of probability and decision theory in AI, following a resurgence of interest epitomized BAYESIAN NETWORK by Peter Cheeseman’s (1985) article “In Defense of Probability.” The **Bayesian network** formalism was invented to allow efficient representation of, and rigorous reasoning with, uncertain knowledge. This approach largely overcomes many problems of the probabilistic reasoning systems of the 1960s and 1970s; it now dominates AI research on uncertain reason ing and expert systems. The approach allows for learning from experience, and it combines the best of classical AI and neural nets. Work by Judea Pearl (1982a) and by Eric Horvitz and David Heckerman (Horvitz and Heckerman, 1986; Horvitz *et al.*, 1986) promoted the idea of *normative* expert systems: ones that act rationally according to the laws of decision theory and do not try to imitate the thought steps of human experts. The WindowsTM operating sys tem includes several normative diagnostic expert systems for correcting problems. Chapters 13 to 16 cover this area.

Similar gentle revolutions have occurred in robotics, computer vision, and knowledge representation. A better understanding of the problems and their complexity properties, com bined with increased mathematical sophistication, has led to workable research agendas and robust methods. Although increased formalization and specialization led fields such as vision and robotics to become somewhat isolated from “mainstream” AI in the 1990s, this trend has reversed in recent years as tools from machine learning in particular have proved effective for many problems. The process of reintegration is already yielding significant benefits

**1.3.9 The emergence of intelligent agents (1995–present)**

Perhaps encouraged by the progress in solving the subproblems of AI, researchers have also started to look at the “whole agent” problem again. The work of Allen Newell, John Laird, and Paul Rosenbloom on SOAR (Newell, 1990; Laird *et al.*, 1987) is the best-known example of a complete agent architecture. One of the most important environments for intelligent agents is the Internet. AI systems have become so common in Web-based applications that the “-bot” suffix has entered everyday language. Moreover, AI technologies underlie many

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Internet tools, such as search engines, recommender systems, and Web site aggregators. One consequence of trying to build complete agents is the realization that the previously isolated subfields of AI might need to be reorganized somewhat when their results are to be tied together. In particular, it is now widely appreciated that sensory systems (vision, sonar, speech recognition, etc.) cannot deliver perfectly reliable information about the environment. Hence, reasoning and planning systems must be able to handle uncertainty. A second major consequence of the agent perspective is that AI has been drawn into much closer contact with other fields, such as control theory and economics, that also deal with agents. Recent progress in the control of robotic cars has derived from a mixture of approaches ranging from better sensors, control-theoretic integration of sensing, localization and mapping, as well as a degree of high-level planning.

Despite these successes, some influential founders of AI, including John McCarthy (2007), Marvin Minsky (2007), Nils Nilsson (1995, 2005) and Patrick Winston (Beal and Winston, 2009), have expressed discontent with the progress of AI. They think that AI should put less emphasis on creating ever-improved versions of applications that are good at a spe cific task, such as driving a car, playing chess, or recognizing speech. Instead, they believe AI should return to its roots of striving for, in Simon’s words, “machines that think, that learn

HUMAN-LEVEL AI and that create.” They call the effort **human-level AI** or HLAI; their first symposium was in 2004 (Minsky *et al.*, 2004). The effort will require very large knowledge bases; Hendler *et al.* (1995) discuss where these knowledge bases might come from.

A related idea is the subfield of **Artificial General Intelligence** or AGI (Goertzel and ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCEPennachin, 2007), which held its first conference and organized the *Journal of Artificial Gen eral Intelligence* in 2008. AGI looks for a universal algorithm for learning and acting in any environment, and has its roots in the work of Ray Solomonoff (1964), one of the atten dees of the original 1956 Dartmouth conference. Guaranteeing that what we create is really FRIENDLY AI **Friendly AI** is also a concern (Yudkowsky, 2008; Omohundro, 2008), one we will return to in Chapter 26.

**1.3.10 The availability of very large data sets (2001–present)**

Throughout the 60-year history of computer science, the emphasis has been on the *algorithm* as the main subject of study. But some recent work in AI suggests that for many problems, it makes more sense to worry about the *data* and be less picky about what algorithm to apply. This is true because of the increasing availability of very large data sources: for example, trillions of words of English and billions of images from the Web (Kilgarriff and Grefenstette, 2006); or billions of base pairs of genomic sequences (Collins *et al.*, 2003).

One influential paper in this line was Yarowsky’s (1995) work on word-sense disam biguation: given the use of the word “plant” in a sentence, does that refer to flora or factory? Previous approaches to the problem had relied on human-labeled examples combined with machine learning algorithms. Yarowsky showed that the task can be done, with accuracy above 96%, with no labeled examples at all. Instead, given a very large corpus of unanno tated text and just the dictionary definitions of the two senses—“works, industrial plant” and “flora, plant life”—one can label examples in the corpus, and from there **bootstrap** to learn

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new patterns that help label new examples. Banko and Brill (2001) show that techniques like this perform even better as the amount of available text goes from a million words to a billion and that the increase in performance from using more data exceeds any difference in algorithm choice; a mediocre algorithm with 100 million words of unlabeled training data outperforms the best known algorithm with 1 million words.

As another example, Hays and Efros (2007) discuss the problem of filling in holes in a photograph. Suppose you use Photoshop to mask out an ex-friend from a group photo, but now you need to fill in the masked area with something that matches the background. Hays and Efros defined an algorithm that searches through a collection of photos to find something that will match. They found the performance of their algorithm was poor when they used a collection of only ten thousand photos, but crossed a threshold into excellent performance when they grew the collection to two million photos.

Work like this suggests that the “knowledge bottleneck” in AI—the problem of how to express all the knowledge that a system needs—may be solved in many applications by learn ing methods rather than hand-coded knowledge engineering, provided the learning algorithms have enough data to go on (Halevy *et al.*, 2009). Reporters have noticed the surge of new ap plications and have written that “AI Winter” may be yielding to a new Spring (Havenstein, 2005). As Kurzweil (2005) writes, “today, many thousands of AI applications are deeply embedded in the infrastructure of every industry.”

1.4 THE STATE OF THE ART



What can AI do today? A concise answer is difficult because there are so many activities in so many subfields. Here we sample a few applications; others appear throughout the book. **Robotic vehicles**: A driverless robotic car named STANLEY sped through the rough terrain of the Mojave dessert at 22 mph, finishing the 132-mile course first to win the 2005 DARPA Grand Challenge. STANLEY is a Volkswagen Touareg outfitted with cameras, radar, and laser rangefinders to sense the environment and onboard software to command the steer ing, braking, and acceleration (Thrun, 2006). The following year CMU’s BOSS won the Ur ban Challenge, safely driving in traffic through the streets of a closed Air Force base, obeying traffic rules and avoiding pedestrians and other vehicles.

**Speech recognition**: A traveler calling United Airlines to book a flight can have the en tire conversation guided by an automated speech recognition and dialog management system. **Autonomous planning and scheduling**: A hundred million miles from Earth, NASA’s Remote Agent program became the first on-board autonomous planning program to control the scheduling of operations for a spacecraft (Jonsson *et al.*, 2000). REMOTE AGENT gen erated plans from high-level goals specified from the ground and monitored the execution of those plans—detecting, diagnosing, and recovering from problems as they occurred. Succes sor program MAPGEN (Al-Chang *et al.*, 2004) plans the daily operations for NASA’s Mars Exploration Rovers, and MEXAR2 (Cesta *et al.*, 2007) did mission planning—both logistics and science planning—for the European Space Agency’s Mars Express mission in 2008.

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**Game playing**: IBM’s DEEP BLUE became the first computer program to defeat the world champion in a chess match when it bested Garry Kasparov by a score of 3.5 to 2.5 in an exhibition match (Goodman and Keene, 1997). Kasparov said that he felt a “new kind of intelligence” across the board from him. *Newsweek* magazine described the match as “The brain’s last stand.” The value of IBM’s stock increased by $18 billion. Human champions studied Kasparov’s loss and were able to draw a few matches in subsequent years, but the most recent human-computer matches have been won convincingly by the computer.

**Spam fighting**: Each day, learning algorithms classify over a billion messages as spam, saving the recipient from having to waste time deleting what, for many users, could comprise 80% or 90% of all messages, if not classified away by algorithms. Because the spammers are continually updating their tactics, it is difficult for a static programmed approach to keep up, and learning algorithms work best (Sahami *et al.*, 1998; Goodman and Heckerman, 2004).

**Logistics planning**: During the Persian Gulf crisis of 1991, U.S. forces deployed a Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool, DART (Cross and Walker, 1994), to do automated logistics planning and scheduling for transportation. This involved up to 50,000 vehicles, cargo, and people at a time, and had to account for starting points, destinations, routes, and conflict resolution among all parameters. The AI planning techniques generated in hours a plan that would have taken weeks with older methods. The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) stated that this single application more than paid back DARPA’s 30-year investment in AI.

**Robotics**: The iRobot Corporation has sold over two million Roomba robotic vacuum cleaners for home use. The company also deploys the more rugged PackBot to Iraq and Afghanistan, where it is used to handle hazardous materials, clear explosives, and identify the location of snipers.

**Machine Translation**: A computer program automatically translates from Arabic to English, allowing an English speaker to see the headline “Ardogan Confirms That Turkey Would Not Accept Any Pressure, Urging Them to Recognize Cyprus.” The program uses a statistical model built from examples of Arabic-to-English translations and from examples of English text totaling two trillion words (Brants *et al.*, 2007). None of the computer scientists on the team speak Arabic, but they do understand statistics and machine learning algorithms.

These are just a few examples of artificial intelligence systems that exist today. Not magic or science fiction—but rather science, engineering, and mathematics, to which this book provides an introduction.

1.5 SUMMARY



This chapter defines AI and establishes the cultural background against which it has devel oped. Some of the important points are as follows:

• Different people approach AI with different goals in mind. Two important questions to ask are: Are you concerned with thinking or behavior? Do you want to model humans or work from an ideal standard?

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• In this book, we adopt the view that intelligence is concerned mainly with **rational action**. Ideally, an **intelligent agent** takes the best possible action in a situation. We study the problem of building agents that are intelligent in this sense.

• Philosophers (going back to 400 B.C.) made AI conceivable by considering the ideas that the mind is in some ways like a machine, that it operates on knowledge encoded in some internal language, and that thought can be used to choose what actions to take.

• Mathematicians provided the tools to manipulate statements of logical certainty as well as uncertain, probabilistic statements. They also set the groundwork for understanding computation and reasoning about algorithms.

• Economists formalized the problem of making decisions that maximize the expected outcome to the decision maker.

• Neuroscientists discovered some facts about how the brain works and the ways in which it is similar to and different from computers.

• Psychologists adopted the idea that humans and animals can be considered information processing machines. Linguists showed that language use fits into this model.

• Computer engineers provided the ever-more-powerful machines that make AI applica tions possible.

• Control theory deals with designing devices that act optimally on the basis of feedback from the environment. Initially, the mathematical tools of control theory were quite different from AI, but the fields are coming closer together.

• The history of AI has had cycles of success, misplaced optimism, and resulting cutbacks in enthusiasm and funding. There have also been cycles of introducing new creative approaches and systematically refining the best ones.

• AI has advanced more rapidly in the past decade because of greater use of the scientific method in experimenting with and comparing approaches.

• Recent progress in understanding the theoretical basis for intelligence has gone hand in hand with improvements in the capabilities of real systems. The subfields of AI have become more integrated, and AI has found common ground with other disciplines.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL NOTES

The methodological status of artificial intelligence is investigated in *The Sciences of the Artifi cial*, by Herb Simon (1981), which discusses research areas concerned with complex artifacts. It explains how AI can be viewed as both science and mathematics. Cohen (1995) gives an overview of experimental methodology within AI.

The Turing Test (Turing, 1950) is discussed by Shieber (1994), who severely criticizes the usefulness of its instantiation in the Loebner Prize competition, and by Ford and Hayes (1995), who argue that the test itself is not helpful for AI. Bringsjord (2008) gives advice for a Turing Test judge. Shieber (2004) and Epstein *et al.* (2008) collect a number of essays on the Turing Test. *Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea*, by John Haugeland (1985), gives a

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readable account of the philosophical and practical problems of AI. Significant early papers in AI are anthologized in the collections by Webber and Nilsson (1981) and by Luger (1995). The *Encyclopedia of AI* (Shapiro, 1992) contains survey articles on almost every topic in AI, as does Wikipedia. These articles usually provide a good entry point into the research literature on each topic. An insightful and comprehensive history of AI is given by Nils Nillson (2009), one of the early pioneers of the field.

The most recent work appears in the proceedings of the major AI conferences: the bi ennial International Joint Conference on AI (IJCAI), the annual European Conference on AI (ECAI), and the National Conference on AI, more often known as AAAI, after its sponsoring organization. The major journals for general AI are *Artificial Intelligence*, *Computational Intelligence*, the *IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence*, *IEEE In telligent Systems*, and the electronic *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*. There are also many conferences and journals devoted to specific areas, which we cover in the appropriate chapters. The main professional societies for AI are the American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), the ACM Special Interest Group in Artificial Intelligence (SIGART), and the Society for Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour (AISB). AAAI’s *AI Magazine* contains many topical and tutorial articles, and its Web site, aaai.org, contains news, tutorials, and background information.

EXERCISES

These exercises are intended to stimulate discussion, and some might be set as term projects. Alternatively, preliminary attempts can be made now, and these attempts can be reviewed after the completion of the book.

**1.1** Define in your own words: (a) intelligence, (b) artificial intelligence, (c) agent, (d) rationality, (e) logical reasoning.

**1.2** Every year the Loebner Prize is awarded to the program that comes closest to passing a version of the Turing Test. Research and report on the latest winner of the Loebner prize. What techniques does it use? How does it advance the state of the art in AI?

**1.3** Are reflex actions (such as flinching from a hot stove) rational? Are they intelligent?

**1.4** There are well-known classes of problems that are intractably difficult for computers, and other classes that are provably undecidable. Does this mean that AI is impossible?

**1.5** The neural structure of the sea slug *Aplysia* has been widely studied (first by Nobel Laureate Eric Kandel) because it has only about 20,000 neurons, most of them large and easily manipulated. Assuming that the cycle time for an *Aplysia* neuron is roughly the same as for a human neuron, how does the computational power, in terms of memory updates per second, compare with the high-end computer described in Figure 1.3?

**1.6** How could introspection—reporting on one’s inner thoughts—be inaccurate? Could I be wrong about what I’m thinking? Discuss.

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**1.7** To what extent are the following computer systems instances of artificial intelligence: • Supermarket bar code scanners.

• Voice-activated telephone menus.

• Spelling and grammar correction features in Microsoft Word.

• Internet routing algorithms that respond dynamically to the state of the network.

**1.8** Many of the computational models of cognitive activities that have been proposed in volve quite complex mathematical operations, such as convolving an image with a Gaussian or finding a minimum of the entropy function. Most humans (and certainly all animals) never learn this kind of mathematics at all, almost no one learns it before college, and almost no one can compute the convolution of a function with a Gaussian in their head. What sense does it make to say that the “vision system” is doing this kind of mathematics, whereas the actual person has no idea how to do it?

**1.9** Some authors have claimed that perception and motor skills are the most important part of intelligence, and that “higher level” capacities are necessarily parasitic—simple add-ons to these underlying facilities. Certainly, most of evolution and a large part of the brain have been devoted to perception and motor skills, whereas AI has found tasks such as game playing and logical inference to be easier, in many ways, than perceiving and acting in the real world. Do you think that AI’s traditional focus on higher-level cognitive abilities is misplaced?

**1.10** Is AI a science, or is it engineering? Or neither or both? Explain.

**1.11** “Surely computers cannot be intelligent—they can do only what their programmers tell them.” Is the latter statement true, and does it imply the former?

**1.12** “Surely animals cannot be intelligent—they can do only what their genes tell them.” Is the latter statement true, and does it imply the former?

**1.13** “Surely animals, humans, and computers cannot be intelligent—they can do only what their constituent atoms are told to do by the laws of physics.” Is the latter statement true, and does it imply the former?

**1.14** Examine the AI literature to discover whether the following tasks can currently be solved by computers:

**a**. Playing a decent game of table tennis (Ping-Pong).

**b**. Driving in the center of Cairo, Egypt.

**c**. Driving in Victorville, California.

**d**. Buying a week’s worth of groceries at the market.

**e**. Buying a week’s worth of groceries on the Web.

**f**. Playing a decent game of bridge at a competitive level.

**g**. Discovering and proving new mathematical theorems.

**h**. Writing an intentionally funny story.

**i**. Giving competent legal advice in a specialized area of law.

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**j**. Translating spoken English into spoken Swedish in real time.

**k**. Performing a complex surgical operation.

For the currently infeasible tasks, try to find out what the difficulties are and predict when, if ever, they will be overcome.

**1.15** Various subfields of AI have held contests by defining a standard task and inviting re searchers to do their best. Examples include the DARPA Grand Challenge for robotic cars, The International Planning Competition, the Robocup robotic soccer league, the TREC infor mation retrieval event, and contests in machine translation, speech recognition. Investigate five of these contests, and describe the progress made over the years. To what degree have the contests advanced toe state of the art in AI? Do what degree do they hurt the field by drawing energy away from new ideas?



2 INTELLIGENT AGENTS

*In which we discuss the nature of agents, perfect or otherwise, the diversity of environments, and the resulting menagerie of agent types.*

Chapter 1 identified the concept of **rational agents** as central to our approach to artificial intelligence. In this chapter, we make this notion more concrete. We will see that the concept of rationality can be applied to a wide variety of agents operating in any imaginable environ ment. Our plan in this book is to use this concept to develop a small set of design principles for building successful agents—systems that can reasonably be called **intelligent**.

We begin by examining agents, environments, and the coupling between them. The observation that some agents behave better than others leads naturally to the idea of a rational agent—one that behaves as well as possible. How well an agent can behave depends on the nature of the environment; some environments are more difficult than others. We give a crude categorization of environments and show how properties of an environment influence the design of suitable agents for that environment. We describe a number of basic “skeleton” agent designs, which we flesh out in the rest of the book.

2.1 AGENTS AND ENVIRONMENTS



ENVIRONMENT An **agent** is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its **environment** through **sensors** and SENSOR acting upon that environment through **actuators**. This simple idea is illustrated in Figure 2.1. ACTUATOR A human agent has eyes, ears, and other organs for sensors and hands, legs, vocal tract, and so

on for actuators. A robotic agent might have cameras and infrared range finders for sensors and various motors for actuators. A software agent receives keystrokes, file contents, and network packets as sensory inputs and acts on the environment by displaying on the screen, writing files, and sending network packets.

PERCEPT We use the term **percept** to refer to the agent’s perceptual inputs at any given instant. An PERCEPT SEQUENCE agent’s **percept sequence** is the complete history of everything the agent has ever perceived. In general, *an agent’s choice of action at any given instant can depend on the entire percept sequence observed to date, but not on anything it hasn’t perceived.* By specifying the agent’s choice of action for every possible percept sequence, we have said more or less everything

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Agent Sensors ?

Actuators

Percepts Actions

Environment

**Figure 2.1** Agents interact with environments through sensors and actuators. 



there is to say about the agent. Mathematically speaking, we say that an agent’s behavior is AGENT FUNCTION described by the **agent function** that maps any given percept sequence to an action. We can imagine *tabulating* the agent function that describes any given agent; for most agents, this would be a very large table—infinite, in fact, unless we place a bound on the length of percept sequences we want to consider. Given an agent to experiment with, we can, in principle, construct this table by trying out all possible percept sequences and recording which actions the agent does in response.1 The table is, of course, an *external* characterization of the agent. *Internally*, the agent function for an artificial agent will be implemented by an AGENT PROGRAM **agent program**. It is important to keep these two ideas distinct. The agent function is an abstract mathematical description; the agent program is a concrete implementation, running within some physical system.

To illustrate these ideas, we use a very simple example—the vacuum-cleaner world shown in Figure 2.2. This world is so simple that we can describe everything that happens; it’s also a made-up world, so we can invent many variations. This particular world has just two locations: squares A and B. The vacuum agent perceives which square it is in and whether there is dirt in the square. It can choose to move left, move right, suck up the dirt, or do nothing. One very simple agent function is the following: if the current square is dirty, then suck; otherwise, move to the other square. A partial tabulation of this agent function is shown in Figure 2.3 and an agent program that implements it appears in Figure 2.8 on page 48.

Looking at Figure 2.3, we see that various vacuum-world agents can be defined simply by filling in the right-hand column in various ways. The obvious question, then, is this: *What is the right way to fill out the table?* In other words, what makes an agent good or bad, intelligent or stupid? We answer these questions in the next section.



1If the agent uses some randomization to choose its actions, then we would have to try each sequence many times to identify the probability of each action. One might imagine that acting randomly is rather silly, but we show later in this chapter that it can be very intelligent.

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A B

**Figure 2.2** A vacuum-cleaner world with just two locations.



Percept sequence Action 

[A, Clean] Right 

[A, Dirty] Suck 

[B, Clean] Left 

[B, Dirty] Suck 

[A, Clean], [A, Clean] Right 

[A, Clean], [A, Dirty] Suck 

...... 

[A, Clean], [A, Clean], [A, Clean] Right 

[A, Clean], [A, Clean], [A, Dirty] Suck 

...... 



**Figure 2.3** Partial tabulation of a simple agent function for the vacuum-cleaner world shown in Figure 2.2.



Before closing this section, we should emphasize that the notion of an agent is meant to be a tool for analyzing systems, not an absolute characterization that divides the world into agents and non-agents. One could view a hand-held calculator as an agent that chooses the action of displaying “4” when given the percept sequence “2 + 2 =,” but such an analysis would hardly aid our understanding of the calculator. In a sense, all areas of engineering can be seen as designing artifacts that interact with the world; AI operates at (what the authors consider to be) the most interesting end of the spectrum, where the artifacts have significant computational resources and the task environment requires nontrivial decision making.

2.2 GOOD BEHAVIOR: THE CONCEPT OF RATIONALITY



RATIONAL AGENT A **rational agent** is one that does the right thing—conceptually speaking, every entry in the table for the agent function is filled out correctly. Obviously, doing the right thing is better than doing the wrong thing, but what does it mean to do the right thing?

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We answer this age-old question in an age-old way: by considering the *consequences* of the agent’s behavior. When an agent is plunked down in an environment, it generates a sequence of actions according to the percepts it receives. This sequence of actions causes the environment to go through a sequence of states. If the sequence is desirable, then the agent

has performed well. This notion of desirability is captured by a **performance measure** that PERFORMANCE MEASUREevaluates any given sequence of environment states.

Notice that we said *environment* states, not *agent* states. If we define success in terms of agent’s opinion of its own performance, an agent could achieve perfect rationality simply by deluding itself that its performance was perfect. Human agents in particular are notorious for “sour grapes”—believing they did not really want something (e.g., a Nobel Prize) after not getting it.

Obviously, there is not one fixed performance measure for all tasks and agents; typically, a designer will devise one appropriate to the circumstances. This is not as easy as it sounds. Consider, for example, the vacuum-cleaner agent from the preceding section. We might propose to measure performance by the amount of dirt cleaned up in a single eight-hour shift. With a rational agent, of course, what you ask for is what you get. A rational agent can maximize this performance measure by cleaning up the dirt, then dumping it all on the floor, then cleaning it up again, and so on. A more suitable performance measure would reward the agent for having a clean floor. For example, one point could be awarded for each clean square at each time step (perhaps with a penalty for electricity consumed and noise generated). *As a general rule, it is better to design performance measures according to what one actually wants in the environment, rather than according to how one thinks the agent should behave.*

Even when the obvious pitfalls are avoided, there remain some knotty issues to untangle. For example, the notion of “clean floor” in the preceding paragraph is based on average cleanliness over time. Yet the same average cleanliness can be achieved by two different agents, one of which does a mediocre job all the time while the other cleans energetically but takes long breaks. Which is preferable might seem to be a fine point of janitorial science, but in fact it is a deep philosophical question with far-reaching implications. Which is better— a reckless life of highs and lows, or a safe but humdrum existence? Which is better—an economy where everyone lives in moderate poverty, or one in which some live in plenty while others are very poor? We leave these questions as an exercise for the diligent reader.

**2.2.1 Rationality**

What is rational at any given time depends on four things:

• The performance measure that defines the criterion of success.

• The agent’s prior knowledge of the environment.

• The actions that the agent can perform.

• The agent’s percept sequence to date.

DEFINITION OF A RATIONAL AGENT

This leads to a **definition of a rational agent**:

*For each possible percept sequence, a rational agent should select an action that is ex pected to maximize its performance measure, given the evidence provided by the percept sequence and whatever built-in knowledge the agent has.*

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Consider the simple vacuum-cleaner agent that cleans a square if it is dirty and moves to the other square if not; this is the agent function tabulated in Figure 2.3. Is this a rational agent? That depends! First, we need to say what the performance measure is, what is known about the environment, and what sensors and actuators the agent has. Let us assume the following:

• The performance measure awards one point for each clean square at each time step, over a “lifetime” of 1000 time steps.

• The “geography” of the environment is known *a priori* (Figure 2.2) but the dirt distri bution and the initial location of the agent are not. Clean squares stay clean and sucking cleans the current square. The Left and Right actions move the agent left and right except when this would take the agent outside the environment, in which case the agent remains where it is.

• The only available actions are Left, Right, and Suck.

• The agent correctly perceives its location and whether that location contains dirt.

We claim that *under these circumstances* the agent is indeed rational; its expected perfor mance is at least as high as any other agent’s. Exercise 2.1 asks you to prove this. One can see easily that the same agent would be irrational under different circum stances. For example, once all the dirt is cleaned up, the agent will oscillate needlessly back and forth; if the performance measure includes a penalty of one point for each movement left or right, the agent will fare poorly. A better agent for this case would do nothing once it is sure that all the squares are clean. If clean squares can become dirty again, the agent should occasionally check and re-clean them if needed. If the geography of the environment is un known, the agent will need to explore it rather than stick to squares A and B. Exercise 2.1 asks you to design agents for these cases.

**2.2.2 Omniscience, learning, and autonomy**

OMNISCIENCE We need to be careful to distinguish between rationality and **omniscience**. An omniscient agent knows the *actual* outcome of its actions and can act accordingly; but omniscience is impossible in reality. Consider the following example: I am walking along the Champs Elys´ees one day and I see an old friend across the street. There is no traffic nearby and I’m not otherwise engaged, so, being rational, I start to cross the street. Meanwhile, at 33,000 feet, a cargo door falls off a passing airliner,2and before I make it to the other side of the street I am flattened. Was I irrational to cross the street? It is unlikely that my obituary would read “Idiot attempts to cross street.”

This example shows that rationality is not the same as perfection. Rationality max imizes *expected* performance, while perfection maximizes *actual* performance. Retreating from a requirement of perfection is not just a question of being fair to agents. The point is that if we expect an agent to do what turns out to be the best action after the fact, it will be impossible to design an agent to fulfill this specification—unless we improve the performance of crystal balls or time machines.

2 See N. Henderson, “New door latches urged for Boeing 747 jumbo jets,” *Washington Post*, August 24, 1989.

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Our definition of rationality does not require omniscience, then, because the rational choice depends only on the percept sequence *to date*. We must also ensure that we haven’t inadvertently allowed the agent to engage in decidedly underintelligent activities. For exam ple, if an agent does not look both ways before crossing a busy road, then its percept sequence will not tell it that there is a large truck approaching at high speed. Does our definition of rationality say that it’s now OK to cross the road? Far from it! First, it would not be rational to cross the road given this uninformative percept sequence: the risk of accident from cross ing without looking is too great. Second, a rational agent should choose the “looking” action before stepping into the street, because looking helps maximize the expected performance. Doing actions *in order to modify future percepts*—sometimes called **information gather ing**—is an important part of rationality and is covered in depth in Chapter 16. A second INFORMATION

GATHERING

EXPLORATION example of information gathering is provided by the **exploration** that must be undertaken by a vacuum-cleaning agent in an initially unknown environment.

LEARNING Our definition requires a rational agent not only to gather information but also to **learn** as much as possible from what it perceives. The agent’s initial configuration could reflect some prior knowledge of the environment, but as the agent gains experience this may be modified and augmented. There are extreme cases in which the environment is completely known *a priori*. In such cases, the agent need not perceive or learn; it simply acts correctly. Of course, such agents are fragile. Consider the lowly dung beetle. After digging its nest and laying its eggs, it fetches a ball of dung from a nearby heap to plug the entrance. If the ball of dung is removed from its grasp *en route*, the beetle continues its task and pantomimes plug ging the nest with the nonexistent dung ball, never noticing that it is missing. Evolution has built an assumption into the beetle’s behavior, and when it is violated, unsuccessful behavior results. Slightly more intelligent is the sphex wasp. The female sphex will dig a burrow, go out and sting a caterpillar and drag it to the burrow, enter the burrow again to check all is well, drag the caterpillar inside, and lay its eggs. The caterpillar serves as a food source when the eggs hatch. So far so good, but if an entomologist moves the caterpillar a few inches away while the sphex is doing the check, it will revert to the “drag” step of its plan and will continue the plan without modification, even after dozens of caterpillar-moving interventions. The sphex is unable to learn that its innate plan is failing, and thus will not change it.

To the extent that an agent relies on the prior knowledge of its designer rather than AUTONOMY on its own percepts, we say that the agent lacks **autonomy**. A rational agent should be autonomous—it should learn what it can to compensate for partial or incorrect prior knowl edge. For example, a vacuum-cleaning agent that learns to foresee where and when additional dirt will appear will do better than one that does not. As a practical matter, one seldom re quires complete autonomy from the start: when the agent has had little or no experience, it would have to act randomly unless the designer gave some assistance. So, just as evolution provides animals with enough built-in reflexes to survive long enough to learn for themselves, it would be reasonable to provide an artificial intelligent agent with some initial knowledge as well as an ability to learn. After sufficient experience of its environment, the behavior of a rational agent can become effectively *independent* of its prior knowledge. Hence, the incorporation of learning allows one to design a single rational agent that will succeed in a vast variety of environments.

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2.3 THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTS



Now that we have a definition of rationality, we are almost ready to think about building TASK ENVIRONMENT rational agents. First, however, we must think about **task environments**, which are essen tially the “problems” to which rational agents are the “solutions.” We begin by showing how to specify a task environment, illustrating the process with a number of examples. We then show that task environments come in a variety of flavors. The flavor of the task environment directly affects the appropriate design for the agent program.

**2.3.1 Specifying the task environment**

In our discussion of the rationality of the simple vacuum-cleaner agent, we had to specify the performance measure, the environment, and the agent’s actuators and sensors. We group all these under the heading of the **task environment**. For the acronymically minded, we call

PEAS this the **PEAS** (**P**erformance, **E**nvironment, **A**ctuators, **S**ensors) description. In designing an agent, the first step must always be to specify the task environment as fully as possible. The vacuum world was a simple example; let us consider a more complex problem: an automated taxi driver. We should point out, before the reader becomes alarmed, that a fully automated taxi is currently somewhat beyond the capabilities of existing technology. (page 28 describes an existing driving robot.) The full driving task is extremely *open-ended*. There is no limit to the novel combinations of circumstances that can arise—another reason we chose it as a focus for discussion. Figure 2.4 summarizes the PEAS description for the taxi’s task environment. We discuss each element in more detail in the following paragraphs.



Agent Type Performance Measure 

Environment Actuators Sensors 



Taxi driver Safe, fast, legal, comfortable trip, 

maximize profits

Roads, other traffic, 

pedestrians, customers

Steering, 

accelerator, brake, signal, horn, display

Cameras, sonar, speedometer, GPS, odometer, accelerometer, engine sensors, keyboard 



**Figure 2.4** PEAS description of the task environment for an automated taxi. 

First, what is the **performance measure** to which we would like our automated driver to aspire? Desirable qualities include getting to the correct destination; minimizing fuel con sumption and wear and tear; minimizing the trip time or cost; minimizing violations of traffic laws and disturbances to other drivers; maximizing safety and passenger comfort; maximiz ing profits. Obviously, some of these goals conflict, so tradeoffs will be required.

Next, what is the driving **environment** that the taxi will face? Any taxi driver must deal with a variety of roads, ranging from rural lanes and urban alleys to 12-lane freeways. The roads contain other traffic, pedestrians, stray animals, road works, police cars, puddles,

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and potholes. The taxi must also interact with potential and actual passengers. There are also some optional choices. The taxi might need to operate in Southern California, where snow is seldom a problem, or in Alaska, where it seldom is not. It could always be driving on the right, or we might want it to be flexible enough to drive on the left when in Britain or Japan. Obviously, the more restricted the environment, the easier the design problem.

The **actuators** for an automated taxi include those available to a human driver: control over the engine through the accelerator and control over steering and braking. In addition, it will need output to a display screen or voice synthesizer to talk back to the passengers, and perhaps some way to communicate with other vehicles, politely or otherwise.

The basic **sensors** for the taxi will include one or more controllable video cameras so that it can see the road; it might augment these with infrared or sonar sensors to detect dis tances to other cars and obstacles. To avoid speeding tickets, the taxi should have a speedome ter, and to control the vehicle properly, especially on curves, it should have an accelerometer. To determine the mechanical state of the vehicle, it will need the usual array of engine, fuel, and electrical system sensors. Like many human drivers, it might want a global positioning system (GPS) so that it doesn’t get lost. Finally, it will need a keyboard or microphone for the passenger to request a destination.

In Figure 2.5, we have sketched the basic PEAS elements for a number of additional agent types. Further examples appear in Exercise 2.4. It may come as a surprise to some read ers that our list of agent types includes some programs that operate in the entirely artificial environment defined by keyboard input and character output on a screen. “Surely,” one might say, “this is not a real environment, is it?” In fact, what matters is not the distinction between “real” and “artificial” environments, but the complexity of the relationship among the behav ior of the agent, the percept sequence generated by the environment, and the performance measure. Some “real” environments are actually quite simple. For example, a robot designed to inspect parts as they come by on a conveyor belt can make use of a number of simplifying assumptions: that the lighting is always just so, that the only thing on the conveyor belt will be parts of a kind that it knows about, and that only two actions (accept or reject) are possible.

SOFTWARE AGENT In contrast, some **software agents** (or software robots or **softbots**) exist in rich, unlim SOFTBOT ited domains. Imagine a softbot Web site operator designed to scan Internet news sources and show the interesting items to its users, while selling advertising space to generate revenue. To do well, that operator will need some natural language processing abilities, it will need to learn what each user and advertiser is interested in, and it will need to change its plans dynamically—for example, when the connection for one news source goes down or when a new one comes online. The Internet is an environment whose complexity rivals that of the physical world and whose inhabitants include many artificial and human agents.

**2.3.2 Properties of task environments**

The range of task environments that might arise in AI is obviously vast. We can, however, identify a fairly small number of dimensions along which task environments can be catego rized. These dimensions determine, to a large extent, the appropriate agent design and the applicability of each of the principal families of techniques for agent implementation. First,

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Agent Type Performance Measure 

Environment Actuators Sensors 



Medical 

diagnosis system

Healthy patient, reduced costs 

Patient, hospital, staff 

Display of 

questions, tests, diagnoses,

treatments,

referrals

Keyboard entry of symptoms, findings, patient’s answers 



Satellite image analysis system 

Correct image categorization 

Downlink from orbiting satellite 

Display of scene categorization 

Color pixel arrays 



Part-picking robot 

Percentage of parts in correct bins 

Conveyor belt with parts; bins 

Jointed arm and hand 

Camera, joint angle sensors 



Refinery controller 

Purity, yield, safety 

Refinery, operators 

Valves, pumps, heaters, displays 

Temperature, pressure, 

chemical sensors



Interactive English tutor 

Student’s score on test 

Set of students, testing agency 

Display of exercises, suggestions, corrections 

Keyboard entry 



**Figure 2.5** Examples of agent types and their PEAS descriptions.



we list the dimensions, then we analyze several task environments to illustrate the ideas. The definitions here are informal; later chapters provide more precise statements and examples of each kind of environment.

FULLY OBSERVABLE **Fully observable** vs. **partially observable**: If an agent’s sensors give it access to the PARTIALLY

OBSERVABLE complete state of the environment at each point in time, then we say that the task environ ment is fully observable. A task environment is effectively fully observable if the sensors detect all aspects that are *relevant* to the choice of action; relevance, in turn, depends on the performance measure. Fully observable environments are convenient because the agent need not maintain any internal state to keep track of the world. An environment might be partially observable because of noisy and inaccurate sensors or because parts of the state are simply missing from the sensor data—for example, a vacuum agent with only a local dirt sensor cannot tell whether there is dirt in other squares, and an automated taxi cannot see what other drivers are thinking. If the agent has no sensors at all then the environment is **unobserv**

UNOBSERVABLE **able**. One might think that in such cases the agent’s plight is hopeless, but, as we discuss in Chapter 4, the agent’s goals may still be achievable, sometimes with certainty.

SINGLE AGENT **Single agent** vs. **multiagent**: The distinction between single-agent and multiagent en MULTIAGENT

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vironments may seem simple enough. For example, an agent solving a crossword puzzle by itself is clearly in a single-agent environment, whereas an agent playing chess is in a two agent environment. There are, however, some subtle issues. First, we have described how an entity *may* be viewed as an agent, but we have not explained which entities *must* be viewed as agents. Does an agent A (the taxi driver for example) have to treat an object B (another vehicle) as an agent, or can it be treated merely as an object behaving according to the laws of physics, analogous to waves at the beach or leaves blowing in the wind? The key distinction is whether B’s behavior is best described as maximizing a performance measure whose value depends on agent A’s behavior. For example, in chess, the opponent entity B is trying to maximize its performance measure, which, by the rules of chess, minimizes agent A’s per

COMPETITIVE formance measure. Thus, chess is a **competitive** multiagent environment. In the taxi-driving environment, on the other hand, avoiding collisions maximizes the performance measure of COOPERATIVE all agents, so it is a partially **cooperative** multiagent environment. It is also partially com petitive because, for example, only one car can occupy a parking space. The agent-design problems in multiagent environments are often quite different from those in single-agent en vironments; for example, **communication** often emerges as a rational behavior in multiagent environments; in some competitive environments, **randomized behavior** is rational because it avoids the pitfalls of predictability.

DETERMINISTIC **Deterministic** vs. **stochastic**. If the next state of the environment is completely deter STOCHASTIC mined by the current state and the action executed by the agent, then we say the environment is deterministic; otherwise, it is stochastic. In principle, an agent need not worry about uncer tainty in a fully observable, deterministic environment. (In our definition, we ignore uncer tainty that arises purely from the actions of other agents in a multiagent environment; thus, a game can be deterministic even though each agent may be unable to predict the actions of the others.) If the environment is partially observable, however, then it could *appear* to be stochastic. Most real situations are so complex that it is impossible to keep track of all the unobserved aspects; for practical purposes, they must be treated as stochastic. Taxi driving is clearly stochastic in this sense, because one can never predict the behavior of traffic exactly; moreover, one’s tires blow out and one’s engine seizes up without warning. The vacuum world as we described it is deterministic, but variations can include stochastic elements such as randomly appearing dirt and an unreliable suction mechanism (Exercise 2.13). We say an UNCERTAIN environment is **uncertain** if it is not fully observable or not deterministic. One final note: our use of the word “stochastic” generally implies that uncertainty about outcomes is quan NONDETERMINISTIC tified in terms of probabilities; a **nondeterministic** environment is one in which actions are characterized by their *possible* outcomes, but no probabilities are attached to them. Nonde terministic environment descriptions are usually associated with performance measures that require the agent to succeed for *all possible* outcomes of its actions.

EPISODIC **Episodic** vs. **sequential**: In an episodic task environment, the agent’s experience is SEQUENTIAL divided into atomic episodes. In each episode the agent receives a percept and then performs a single action. Crucially, the next episode does not depend on the actions taken in previous episodes. Many classification tasks are episodic. For example, an agent that has to spot defective parts on an assembly line bases each decision on the current part, regardless of previous decisions; moreover, the current decision doesn’t affect whether the next part is

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defective. In sequential environments, on the other hand, the current decision could affect all future decisions.3 Chess and taxi driving are sequential: in both cases, short-term actions can have long-term consequences. Episodic environments are much simpler than sequential environments because the agent does not need to think ahead.

STATIC **Static** vs. **dynamic**: If the environment can change while an agent is deliberating, then DYNAMIC we say the environment is dynamic for that agent; otherwise, it is static. Static environments are easy to deal with because the agent need not keep looking at the world while it is deciding on an action, nor need it worry about the passage of time. Dynamic environments, on the other hand, are continuously asking the agent what it wants to do; if it hasn’t decided yet, that counts as deciding to do nothing. If the environment itself does not change with the passage of time but the agent’s performance score does, then we say the environment is SEMIDYNAMIC **semidynamic**. Taxi driving is clearly dynamic: the other cars and the taxi itself keep moving while the driving algorithm dithers about what to do next. Chess, when played with a clock, is semidynamic. Crossword puzzles are static.

DISCRETE **Discrete** vs. **continuous**: The discrete/continuous distinction applies to the *state* of the CONTINUOUS environment, to the way *time* is handled, and to the *percepts* and *actions* of the agent. For example, the chess environment has a finite number of distinct states (excluding the clock). Chess also has a discrete set of percepts and actions. Taxi driving is a continuous-state and continuous-time problem: the speed and location of the taxi and of the other vehicles sweep through a range of continuous values and do so smoothly over time. Taxi-driving actions are also continuous (steering angles, etc.). Input from digital cameras is discrete, strictly speak

ing, but is typically treated as representing continuously varying intensities and locations. KNOWN **Known** vs. **unknown**: Strictly speaking, this distinction refers not to the environment UNKNOWN itself but to the agent’s (or designer’s) state of knowledge about the “laws of physics” of

the environment. In a known environment, the outcomes (or outcome probabilities if the environment is stochastic) for all actions are given. Obviously, if the environment is unknown, the agent will have to learn how it works in order to make good decisions. Note that the distinction between known and unknown environments is not the same as the one between fully and partially observable environments. It is quite possible for a *known* environment to be *partially* observable—for example, in solitaire card games, I know the rules but am still unable to see the cards that have not yet been turned over. Conversely, an *unknown* environment can be *fully* observable—in a new video game, the screen may show the entire game state but I still don’t know what the buttons do until I try them.

As one might expect, the hardest case is *partially observable*, *multiagent*, *stochastic*, *sequential*, *dynamic*, *continuous*, and *unknown*. Taxi driving is hard in all these senses, except that for the most part the driver’s environment is known. Driving a rented car in a new country with unfamiliar geography and traffic laws is a lot more exciting.

Figure 2.6 lists the properties of a number of familiar environments. Note that the answers are not always cut and dried. For example, we describe the part-picking robot as episodic, because it normally considers each part in isolation. But if one day there is a large

3 The word “sequential” is also used in computer science as the antonym of “parallel.” The two meanings are largely unrelated.

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Task Environment Observable Agents Deterministic Episodic Static Discrete 



Crossword puzzle Fully Single Deterministic Sequential Static Discrete Chess with a clock Fully Multi Deterministic Sequential Semi Discrete 

Poker Partially Multi Stochastic Sequential Static Discrete Backgammon Fully Multi Stochastic Sequential Static Discrete 

Taxi driving Partially Multi Stochastic Sequential Dynamic Continuous Medical diagnosis Partially Single Stochastic Sequential Dynamic Continuous 

Image analysis Fully Single Deterministic Episodic Semi Continuous Part-picking robot Partially Single Stochastic Episodic Dynamic Continuous 

Refinery controller Partially Single Stochastic Sequential Dynamic Continuous Interactive English tutor Partially Multi Stochastic Sequential Dynamic Discrete 



**Figure 2.6** Examples of task environments and their characteristics.



batch of defective parts, the robot should learn from several observations that the distribution of defects has changed, and should modify its behavior for subsequent parts. We have not included a “known/unknown” column because, as explained earlier, this is not strictly a prop erty of the environment. For some environments, such as chess and poker, it is quite easy to supply the agent with full knowledge of the rules, but it is nonetheless interesting to consider how an agent might learn to play these games without such knowledge.

Several of the answers in the table depend on how the task environment is defined. We have listed the medical-diagnosis task as single-agent because the disease process in a patient is not profitably modeled as an agent; but a medical-diagnosis system might also have to deal with recalcitrant patients and skeptical staff, so the environment could have a multiagent aspect. Furthermore, medical diagnosis is episodic if one conceives of the task as selecting a diagnosis given a list of symptoms; the problem is sequential if the task can include proposing a series of tests, evaluating progress over the course of treatment, and so on. Also, many environments are episodic at higher levels than the agent’s individual actions. For example, a chess tournament consists of a sequence of games; each game is an episode because (by and large) the contribution of the moves in one game to the agent’s overall performance is not affected by the moves in its previous game. On the other hand, decision making within a single game is certainly sequential.

The code repository associated with this book (aima.cs.berkeley.edu) includes imple mentations of a number of environments, together with a general-purpose environment simu lator that places one or more agents in a simulated environment, observes their behavior over time, and evaluates them according to a given performance measure. Such experiments are often carried out not for a single environment but for many environments drawn from an **en**

**vironment class**. For example, to evaluate a taxi driver in simulated traffic, we would want to ENVIRONMENT CLASSrun many simulations with different traffic, lighting, and weather conditions. If we designed the agent for a single scenario, we might be able to take advantage of specific properties of the particular case but might not identify a good design for driving in general. For this

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reason, the code repository also includes an **environment generator** for each environment ENVIRONMENT

GENERATOR

class that selects particular environments (with certain likelihoods) in which to run the agent. For example, the vacuum environment generator initializes the dirt pattern and agent location randomly. We are then interested in the agent’s average performance over the environment class. A rational agent for a given environment class maximizes this average performance. Exercises 2.9 to 2.13 take you through the process of developing an environment class and evaluating various agents therein.

2.4 THE STRUCTURE OF AGENTS



So far we have talked about agents by describing *behavior*—the action that is performed after any given sequence of percepts. Now we must bite the bullet and talk about how the insides AGENT PROGRAM work. The job of AI is to design an **agent program** that implements the agent function— the mapping from percepts to actions. We assume this program will run on some sort of ARCHITECTURE computing device with physical sensors and actuators—we call this the **architecture**:

*agent* = *architecture* + *program* .

Obviously, the program we choose has to be one that is appropriate for the architecture. If the program is going to recommend actions like *Walk*, the architecture had better have legs. The architecture might be just an ordinary PC, or it might be a robotic car with several onboard computers, cameras, and other sensors. In general, the architecture makes the percepts from the sensors available to the program, runs the program, and feeds the program’s action choices to the actuators as they are generated. Most of this book is about designing agent programs, although Chapters 24 and 25 deal directly with the sensors and actuators.

**2.4.1 Agent programs**

The agent programs that we design in this book all have the same skeleton: they take the current percept as input from the sensors and return an action to the actuators.4 Notice the difference between the agent program, which takes the current percept as input, and the agent function, which takes the entire percept history. The agent program takes just the current percept as input because nothing more is available from the environment; if the agent’s actions need to depend on the entire percept sequence, the agent will have to remember the percepts.

We describe the agent programs in the simple pseudocode language that is defined in Appendix B. (The online code repository contains implementations in real programming languages.) For example, Figure 2.7 shows a rather trivial agent program that keeps track of the percept sequence and then uses it to index into a table of actions to decide what to do. The table—an example of which is given for the vacuum world in Figure 2.3—represents explicitly the agent function that the agent program embodies. To build a rational agent in

4 There are other choices for the agent program skeleton; for example, we could have the agent programs be **coroutines** that run asynchronously with the environment. Each such coroutine has an input and output port and consists of a loop that reads the input port for percepts and writes actions to the output port.

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**function** TABLE-DRIVEN-AGENT(percept) **returns** an action

**persistent**: percepts, a sequence, initially empty

table, a table of actions, indexed by percept sequences, initially fully specified

append percept to the end of percepts

action ← LOOKUP(percepts,table)

**return** action

**Figure 2.7** The TABLE-DRIVEN-AGENT program is invoked for each new percept and returns an action each time. It retains the complete percept sequence in memory.



this way, we as designers must construct a table that contains the appropriate action for every possible percept sequence.

It is instructive to consider why the table-driven approach to agent construction is doomed to failure. Let P be the set of possible percepts and let T be the lifetime of the agent (the total number of percepts it will receive). The lookup table will contain PTt = 1 |P|t entries. Consider the automated taxi: the visual input from a single camera comes in at the rate of roughly 27 megabytes per second (30 frames per second, 640 × 480 pixels with 24 bits of color information). This gives a lookup table with over 10250,000,000,000 entries for an hour’s driving. Even the lookup table for chess—a tiny, well-behaved fragment of the real world—would have at least 10150 entries. The daunting size of these tables (the number of atoms in the observable universe is less than 1080) means that (a) no physical agent in this universe will have the space to store the table, (b) the designer would not have time to create the table, (c) no agent could ever learn all the right table entries from its experience, and (d) even if the environment is simple enough to yield a feasible table size, the designer still has no guidance about how to fill in the table entries.

Despite all this, TABLE-DRIVEN-AGENT *does* do what we want: it implements the desired agent function. The key challenge for AI is to find out how to write programs that, to the extent possible, produce rational behavior from a smallish program rather than from a vast table. We have many examples showing that this can be done successfully in other areas: for example, the huge tables of square roots used by engineers and schoolchildren prior to the 1970s have now been replaced by a five-line program for Newton’s method running on electronic calculators. The question is, can AI do for general intelligent behavior what Newton did for square roots? We believe the answer is yes.

In the remainder of this section, we outline four basic kinds of agent programs that embody the principles underlying almost all intelligent systems:

• Simple reflex agents;

• Model-based reflex agents;

• Goal-based agents; and

• Utility-based agents.

Each kind of agent program combines particular components in particular ways to generate actions. Section 2.4.6 explains in general terms how to convert all these agents into *learning*

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**function** REFLEX-VACUUM-AGENT([location,status]) **returns** an action

**if** status = Dirty **then return** Suck

**else if** location = A **then return** Right

**else if** location = B **then return** Left

**Figure 2.8** The agent program for a simple reflex agent in the two-state vacuum environ ment. This program implements the agent function tabulated in Figure 2.3.



*agents* that can improve the performance of their components so as to generate better actions. Finally, Section 2.4.7 describes the variety of ways in which the components themselves can be represented within the agent. This variety provides a major organizing principle for the field and for the book itself.

**2.4.2 Simple reflex agents**

The simplest kind of agent is the **simple reflex agent**. These agents select actions on the basis SIMPLE REFLEX

AGENT

of the *current* percept, ignoring the rest of the percept history. For example, the vacuum agent whose agent function is tabulated in Figure 2.3 is a simple reflex agent, because its decision is based only on the current location and on whether that location contains dirt. An agent program for this agent is shown in Figure 2.8.

Notice that the vacuum agent program is very small indeed compared to the correspond ing table. The most obvious reduction comes from ignoring the percept history, which cuts down the number of possibilities from 4Tto just 4. A further, small reduction comes from the fact that when the current square is dirty, the action does not depend on the location.

Simple reflex behaviors occur even in more complex environments. Imagine yourself as the driver of the automated taxi. If the car in front brakes and its brake lights come on, then you should notice this and initiate braking. In other words, some processing is done on the visual input to establish the condition we call “The car in front is braking.” Then, this triggers some established connection in the agent program to the action “initiate braking.” We call such a connection a **condition–action rule**,5 written as CONDITION–ACTION

RULE

**if** *car-in-front-is-braking* **then** *initiate-braking*.

Humans also have many such connections, some of which are learned responses (as for driv ing) and some of which are innate reflexes (such as blinking when something approaches the eye). In the course of the book, we show several different ways in which such connections can be learned and implemented.

The program in Figure 2.8 is specific to one particular vacuum environment. A more general and flexible approach is first to build a general-purpose interpreter for condition– action rules and then to create rule sets for specific task environments. Figure 2.9 gives the structure of this general program in schematic form, showing how the condition–action rules allow the agent to make the connection from percept to action. (Do not worry if this seems

5 Also called **situation–action rules**, **productions**, or **if–then rules**.

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Agent

Environment

Sensors

What the world is like now

What action I

should do now Condition-action rules

Actuators

**Figure 2.9** Schematic diagram of a simple reflex agent. 





**function** SIMPLE-REFLEX-AGENT(percept) **returns** an action

**persistent**: rules, a set of condition–action rules

state ← INTERPRET-INPUT(percept)

rule ← RULE-MATCH(state, rules)

action ← rule.ACTION

**return** action

**Figure 2.10** A simple reflex agent. It acts according to a rule whose condition matches the current state, as defined by the percept.



trivial; it gets more interesting shortly.) We use rectangles to denote the current internal state of the agent’s decision process, and ovals to represent the background information used in the process. The agent program, which is also very simple, is shown in Figure 2.10. The INTERPRET-INPUT function generates an abstracted description of the current state from the percept, and the RULE-MATCH function returns the first rule in the set of rules that matches the given state description. Note that the description in terms of “rules” and “matching” is purely conceptual; actual implementations can be as simple as a collection of logic gates implementing a Boolean circuit.

Simple reflex agents have the admirable property of being simple, but they turn out to be of limited intelligence. The agent in Figure 2.10 will work *only if the correct decision can be made on the basis of only the current percept—that is, only if the environment is fully observ able.* Even a little bit of unobservability can cause serious trouble. For example, the braking rule given earlier assumes that the condition *car-in-front-is-braking* can be determined from the current percept—a single frame of video. This works if the car in front has a centrally mounted brake light. Unfortunately, older models have different configurations of taillights,

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brake lights, and turn-signal lights, and it is not always possible to tell from a single image whether the car is braking. A simple reflex agent driving behind such a car would either brake continuously and unnecessarily, or, worse, never brake at all.

We can see a similar problem arising in the vacuum world. Suppose that a simple reflex vacuum agent is deprived of its location sensor and has only a dirt sensor. Such an agent has just two possible percepts: [Dirty] and [Clean]. It can Suck in response to [Dirty]; what should it do in response to [Clean]? Moving Left fails (forever) if it happens to start in square A, and moving Right fails (forever) if it happens to start in square B. Infinite loops are often unavoidable for simple reflex agents operating in partially observable environments.

RANDOMIZATION Escape from infinite loops is possible if the agent can **randomize** its actions. For ex ample, if the vacuum agent perceives [Clean], it might flip a coin to choose between Left and Right. It is easy to show that the agent will reach the other square in an average of two steps. Then, if that square is dirty, the agent will clean it and the task will be complete. Hence, a randomized simple reflex agent might outperform a deterministic simple reflex agent.

We mentioned in Section 2.3 that randomized behavior of the right kind can be rational in some multiagent environments. In single-agent environments, randomization is usually *not* rational. It is a useful trick that helps a simple reflex agent in some situations, but in most cases we can do much better with more sophisticated deterministic agents.

**2.4.3 Model-based reflex agents**

The most effective way to handle partial observability is for the agent to *keep track of the part of the world it can’t see now*. That is, the agent should maintain some sort of **internal** INTERNAL STATE **state** that depends on the percept history and thereby reflects at least some of the unobserved aspects of the current state. For the braking problem, the internal state is not too extensive— just the previous frame from the camera, allowing the agent to detect when two red lights at the edge of the vehicle go on or off simultaneously. For other driving tasks such as changing lanes, the agent needs to keep track of where the other cars are if it can’t see them all at once.

And for any driving to be possible at all, the agent needs to keep track of where its keys are. Updating this internal state information as time goes by requires two kinds of knowl edge to be encoded in the agent program. First, we need some information about how the world evolves independently of the agent—for example, that an overtaking car generally will be closer behind than it was a moment ago. Second, we need some information about how the agent’s own actions affect the world—for example, that when the agent turns the steering wheel clockwise, the car turns to the right, or that after driving for five minutes northbound on the freeway, one is usually about five miles north of where one was five minutes ago. This knowledge about “how the world works”—whether implemented in simple Boolean circuits or in complete scientific theories—is called a **model** of the world. An agent that uses such a

MODEL-BASED

model is called a **model-based agent**.

AGENTFigure 2.11 gives the structure of the model-based reflex agent with internal state, show ing how the current percept is combined with the old internal state to generate the updated description of the current state, based on the agent’s model of how the world works. The agent program is shown in Figure 2.12. The interesting part is the function UPDATE-STATE, which

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Sensors

State

How the world evolves

What my actions do

Condition-action rules

Agent

**Figure 2.11** A model-based reflex agent.

What the world is like now

What action I should do now

Actuators

Environment 





**function** MODEL-BASED-REFLEX-AGENT(percept) **returns** an action

**persistent**: state, the agent’s current conception of the world state

model, a description of how the next state depends on current state and action rules, a set of condition–action rules

action, the most recent action, initially none

state ← UPDATE-STATE(state, action, percept, model)

rule ← RULE-MATCH(state, rules)

action ← rule.ACTION

**return** action

**Figure 2.12** A model-based reflex agent. It keeps track of the current state of the world, using an internal model. It then chooses an action in the same way as the reflex agent.



is responsible for creating the new internal state description. The details of how models and states are represented vary widely depending on the type of environment and the particular technology used in the agent design. Detailed examples of models and updating algorithms appear in Chapters 4, 12, 11, 15, 17, and 25.

Regardless of the kind of representation used, it is seldom possible for the agent to determine the current state of a partially observable environment *exactly*. Instead, the box labeled “what the world is like now” (Figure 2.11) represents the agent’s “best guess” (or sometimes best guesses). For example, an automated taxi may not be able to see around the large truck that has stopped in front of it and can only guess about what may be causing the hold-up. Thus, uncertainty about the current state may be unavoidable, but the agent still has to make a decision.

A perhaps less obvious point about the internal “state” maintained by a model-based agent is that it does not have to describe “what the world is like now” in a literal sense. For

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Sensors

State

What the world

How the world evolves What my actions do

Goals

Agent

is like now

What it will be like if I do action *A*

What action I

should do now Actuators

Environment

**Figure 2.13** A model-based, goal-based agent. It keeps track of the world state as well as a set of goals it is trying to achieve, and chooses an action that will (eventually) lead to the achievement of its goals. 



example, the taxi may be driving back home, and it may have a rule telling it to fill up with gas on the way home unless it has at least half a tank. Although “driving back home” may *seem* to an aspect of the world state, the fact of the taxi’s *destination* is actually an aspect of the agent’s internal state. If you find this puzzling, consider that the taxi could be in exactly the same place at the same time, but intending to reach a different destination.

**2.4.4 Goal-based agents**

Knowing something about the current state of the environment is not always enough to decide what to do. For example, at a road junction, the taxi can turn left, turn right, or go straight on. The correct decision depends on where the taxi is trying to get to. In other words, as well

GOAL as a current state description, the agent needs some sort of **goal** information that describes situations that are desirable—for example, being at the passenger’s destination. The agent program can combine this with the model (the same information as was used in the model based reflex agent) to choose actions that achieve the goal. Figure 2.13 shows the goal-based agent’s structure.

Sometimes goal-based action selection is straightforward—for example, when goal sat isfaction results immediately from a single action. Sometimes it will be more tricky—for example, when the agent has to consider long sequences of twists and turns in order to find a way to achieve the goal. **Search** (Chapters 3 to 5) and **planning** (Chapters 10 and 11) are the subfields of AI devoted to finding action sequences that achieve the agent’s goals.

Notice that decision making of this kind is fundamentally different from the condition– action rules described earlier, in that it involves consideration of the future—both “What will happen if I do such-and-such?” and “Will that make me happy?” In the reflex agent designs, this information is not explicitly represented, because the built-in rules map directly from

Section 2.4. The Structure of Agents 53 

percepts to actions. The reflex agent brakes when it sees brake lights. A goal-based agent, in principle, could reason that if the car in front has its brake lights on, it will slow down. Given the way the world usually evolves, the only action that will achieve the goal of not hitting other cars is to brake.

Although the goal-based agent appears less efficient, it is more flexible because the knowledge that supports its decisions is represented explicitly and can be modified. If it starts to rain, the agent can update its knowledge of how effectively its brakes will operate; this will automatically cause all of the relevant behaviors to be altered to suit the new conditions. For the reflex agent, on the other hand, we would have to rewrite many condition–action rules. The goal-based agent’s behavior can easily be changed to go to a different destination, simply by specifying that destination as the goal. The reflex agent’s rules for when to turn and when to go straight will work only for a single destination; they must all be replaced to go somewhere new.

**2.4.5 Utility-based agents**

Goals alone are not enough to generate high-quality behavior in most environments. For example, many action sequences will get the taxi to its destination (thereby achieving the goal) but some are quicker, safer, more reliable, or cheaper than others. Goals just provide a crude binary distinction between “happy” and “unhappy” states. A more general performance measure should allow a comparison of different world states according to exactly how happy they would make the agent. Because “happy” does not sound very scientific, economists and

computer scientists use the term **utility** instead.6

UTILITY

We have already seen that a performance measure assigns a score to any given sequence of environment states, so it can easily distinguish between more and less desirable ways of

UTILITY FUNCTION getting to the taxi’s destination. An agent’s **utility function** is essentially an internalization of the performance measure. If the internal utility function and the external performance measure are in agreement, then an agent that chooses actions to maximize its utility will be rational according to the external performance measure.

Let us emphasize again that this is not the *only* way to be rational—we have already seen a rational agent program for the vacuum world (Figure 2.8) that has no idea what its utility function is—but, like goal-based agents, a utility-based agent has many advantages in terms of flexibility and learning. Furthermore, in two kinds of cases, goals are inadequate but a utility-based agent can still make rational decisions. First, when there are conflicting goals, only some of which can be achieved (for example, speed and safety), the utility function specifies the appropriate tradeoff. Second, when there are several goals that the agent can aim for, none of which can be achieved with certainty, utility provides a way in which the likelihood of success can be weighed against the importance of the goals.

Partial observability and stochasticity are ubiquitous in the real world, and so, therefore, is decision making under uncertainty. Technically speaking, a rational utility-based agent EXPECTED UTILITY chooses the action that maximizes the **expected utility** of the action outcomes—that is, the utility the agent expects to derive, on average, given the probabilities and utilities of each

6 The word “utility” here refers to “the quality of being useful,” not to the electric company or waterworks.

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Sensors

State

How the world evolves What my actions do

Utility

Agent

What the world is like now

What it will be like if I do action *A*

How happy I will be in such a state

What action I

should do now

Actuators

Environment

**Figure 2.14** A model-based, utility-based agent. It uses a model of the world, along with a utility function that measures its preferences among states of the world. Then it chooses the action that leads to the best expected utility, where expected utility is computed by averaging over all possible outcome states, weighted by the probability of the outcome. 



outcome. (Appendix A defines expectation more precisely.) In Chapter 16, we show that any rational agent must behave *as if* it possesses a utility function whose expected value it tries to maximize. An agent that possesses an *explicit* utility function can make rational decisions with a general-purpose algorithm that does not depend on the specific utility function being maximized. In this way, the “global” definition of rationality—designating as rational those agent functions that have the highest performance—is turned into a “local” constraint on rational-agent designs that can be expressed in a simple program.

The utility-based agent structure appears in Figure 2.14. Utility-based agent programs appear in Part IV, where we design decision-making agents that must handle the uncertainty inherent in stochastic or partially observable environments.

At this point, the reader may be wondering, “Is it that simple? We just build agents that maximize expected utility, and we’re done?” It’s true that such agents would be intelligent, but it’s not simple. A utility-based agent has to model and keep track of its environment, tasks that have involved a great deal of research on perception, representation, reasoning, and learning. The results of this research fill many of the chapters of this book. Choosing the utility-maximizing course of action is also a difficult task, requiring ingenious algorithms that fill several more chapters. Even with these algorithms, perfect rationality is usually unachievable in practice because of computational complexity, as we noted in Chapter 1.

**2.4.6 Learning agents**

We have described agent programs with various methods for selecting actions. We have not, so far, explained how the agent programs *come into being*. In his famous early paper, Turing (1950) considers the idea of actually programming his intelligent machines by hand.

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Performance standard

Critic

feedback

Learning

element

learning

goals

Problem

generator

Agent

changes

knowledge

Sensors

Performance element

Actuators

Environment

**Figure 2.15** A general learning agent. 



He estimates how much work this might take and concludes “Some more expeditious method seems desirable.” The method he proposes is to build learning machines and then to teach them. In many areas of AI, this is now the preferred method for creating state-of-the-art systems. Learning has another advantage, as we noted earlier: it allows the agent to operate in initially unknown environments and to become more competent than its initial knowledge alone might allow. In this section, we briefly introduce the main ideas of learning agents. Throughout the book, we comment on opportunities and methods for learning in particular kinds of agents. Part V goes into much more depth on the learning algorithms themselves.

A learning agent can be divided into four conceptual components, as shown in Fig LEARNING ELEMENT ure 2.15. The most important distinction is between the **learning element**, which is re sponsible for making improvements, and the **performance element**, which is responsible for PERFORMANCE ELEMENTselecting external actions. The performance element is what we have previously considered

to be the entire agent: it takes in percepts and decides on actions. The learning element uses CRITIC feedback from the **critic** on how the agent is doing and determines how the performance element should be modified to do better in the future.

The design of the learning element depends very much on the design of the performance element. When trying to design an agent that learns a certain capability, the first question is not “How am I going to get it to learn this?” but “What kind of performance element will my agent need to do this once it has learned how?” Given an agent design, learning mechanisms can be constructed to improve every part of the agent.

The critic tells the learning element how well the agent is doing with respect to a fixed performance standard. The critic is necessary because the percepts themselves provide no indication of the agent’s success. For example, a chess program could receive a percept indicating that it has checkmated its opponent, but it needs a performance standard to know that this is a good thing; the percept itself does not say so. It is important that the performance

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standard be fixed. Conceptually, one should think of it as being outside the agent altogether because the agent must not modify it to fit its own behavior.

The last component of the learning agent is the **problem generator**. It is responsible PROBLEM

GENERATOR

for suggesting actions that will lead to new and informative experiences. The point is that if the performance element had its way, it would keep doing the actions that are best, given what it knows. But if the agent is willing to explore a little and do some perhaps suboptimal actions in the short run, it might discover much better actions for the long run. The problem generator’s job is to suggest these exploratory actions. This is what scientists do when they carry out experiments. Galileo did not think that dropping rocks from the top of a tower in Pisa was valuable in itself. He was not trying to break the rocks or to modify the brains of unfortunate passers-by. His aim was to modify his own brain by identifying a better theory of the motion of objects.

To make the overall design more concrete, let us return to the automated taxi example. The performance element consists of whatever collection of knowledge and procedures the taxi has for selecting its driving actions. The taxi goes out on the road and drives, using this performance element. The critic observes the world and passes information along to the learning element. For example, after the taxi makes a quick left turn across three lanes of traf fic, the critic observes the shocking language used by other drivers. From this experience, the learning element is able to formulate a rule saying this was a bad action, and the performance element is modified by installation of the new rule. The problem generator might identify certain areas of behavior in need of improvement and suggest experiments, such as trying out the brakes on different road surfaces under different conditions.

The learning element can make changes to any of the “knowledge” components shown in the agent diagrams (Figures 2.9, 2.11, 2.13, and 2.14). The simplest cases involve learning directly from the percept sequence. Observation of pairs of successive states of the environ ment can allow the agent to learn “How the world evolves,” and observation of the results of its actions can allow the agent to learn “What my actions do.” For example, if the taxi exerts a certain braking pressure when driving on a wet road, then it will soon find out how much deceleration is actually achieved. Clearly, these two learning tasks are more difficult if the environment is only partially observable.

The forms of learning in the preceding paragraph do not need to access the external performance standard—in a sense, the standard is the universal one of making predictions that agree with experiment. The situation is slightly more complex for a utility-based agent that wishes to learn utility information. For example, suppose the taxi-driving agent receives no tips from passengers who have been thoroughly shaken up during the trip. The external performance standard must inform the agent that the loss of tips is a negative contribution to its overall performance; then the agent might be able to learn that violent maneuvers do not contribute to its own utility. In a sense, the performance standard distinguishes part of the incoming percept as a **reward** (or **penalty**) that provides direct feedback on the quality of the agent’s behavior. Hard-wired performance standards such as pain and hunger in animals can be understood in this way. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 21.

In summary, agents have a variety of components, and those components can be repre sented in many ways within the agent program, so there appears to be great variety among

Section 2.4. The Structure of Agents 57 

learning methods. There is, however, a single unifying theme. Learning in intelligent agents can be summarized as a process of modification of each component of the agent to bring the components into closer agreement with the available feedback information, thereby improv ing the overall performance of the agent.

**2.4.7 How the components of agent programs work**

We have described agent programs (in very high-level terms) as consisting of various compo nents, whose function it is to answer questions such as: “What is the world like now?” “What action should I do now?” “What do my actions do?” The next question for a student of AI is, “How on earth do these components work?” It takes about a thousand pages to begin to answer that question properly, but here we want to draw the reader’s attention to some basic distinctions among the various ways that the components can represent the environment that the agent inhabits.

Roughly speaking, we can place the representations along an axis of increasing com plexity and expressive power—**atomic**, **factored**, and **structured**. To illustrate these ideas, it helps to consider a particular agent component, such as the one that deals with “What my actions do.” This component describes the changes that might occur in the environment as the result of taking an action, and Figure 2.16 provides schematic depictions of how those transitions might be represented.



B C

B C

(a) Atomic (b) Factored (b) Structured

**Figure 2.16** Three ways to represent states and the transitions between them. (a) Atomic representation: a state (such as B or C) is a black box with no internal structure; (b) Factored representation: a state consists of a vector of attribute values; values can be Boolean, real valued, or one of a fixed set of symbols. (c) Structured representation: a state includes objects, each of which may have attributes of its own as well as relationships to other objects.

In an **atomic representation** each state of the world is indivisible—it has no internal ATOMIC

REPRESENTATION

structure. Consider the problem of finding a driving route from one end of a country to the other via some sequence of cities (we address this problem in Figure 3.2 on page 68). For the purposes of solving this problem, it may suffice to reduce the state of world to just the name of the city we are in—a single atom of knowledge; a “black box” whose only discernible property is that of being identical to or different from another black box. The algorithms

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underlying **search** and **game-playing** (Chapters 3–5), **Hidden Markov models** (Chapter 15), and **Markov decision processes** (Chapter 17) all work with atomic representations—or, at least, they treat representations *as if* they were atomic.

Now consider a higher-fidelity description for the same problem, where we need to be concerned with more than just atomic location in one city or another; we might need to pay attention to how much gas is in the tank, our current GPS coordinates, whether or not the oil warning light is working, how much spare change we have for toll crossings, what station is on the radio, and so on. A **factored representation** splits up each state into a fixed set of FACTORED

REPRESENTATION

VARIABLE **variables** or **attributes**, each of which can have a **value**. While two different atomic states

ATTRIBUTE VALUE

have nothing in common—they are just different black boxes—two different factored states can share some attributes (such as being at some particular GPS location) and not others (such as having lots of gas or having no gas); this makes it much easier to work out how to turn one state into another. With factored representations, we can also represent *uncertainty*—for example, ignorance about the amount of gas in the tank can be represented by leaving that attribute blank. Many important areas of AI are based on factored representations, including **constraint satisfaction** algorithms (Chapter 6), **propositional logic** (Chapter 7), **planning** (Chapters 10 and 11), **Bayesian networks** (Chapters 13–16), and the **machine learning** al gorithms in Chapters 18, 20, and 21.

For many purposes, we need to understand the world as having *things* in it that are *related* to each other, not just variables with values. For example, we might notice that a large truck ahead of us is reversing into the driveway of a dairy farm but a cow has got loose and is blocking the truck’s path. A factored representation is unlikely to be pre-equipped with the attribute TruckAheadBackingIntoDairyFarmDrivewayBlockedByLooseCow with

value true or false. Instead, we would need a **structured representation**, in which ob- STRUCTURED REPRESENTATIONjects such as cows and trucks and their various and varying relationships can be described explicitly. (See Figure 2.16(c).) Structured representations underlie **relational databases** and **first-order logic** (Chapters 8, 9, and 12), **first-order probability models** (Chapter 14), **knowledge-based learning** (Chapter 19) and much of **natural language understanding** (Chapters 22 and 23). In fact, almost everything that humans express in natural language concerns objects and their relationships.

As we mentioned earlier, the axis along which atomic, factored, and structured repre EXPRESSIVENESS sentations lie is the axis of increasing **expressiveness**. Roughly speaking, a more expressive representation can capture, at least as concisely, everything a less expressive one can capture, plus some more. Often, the more expressive language is *much* more concise; for example, the rules of chess can be written in a page or two of a structured-representation language such as first-order logic but require thousands of pages when written in a factored-representation language such as propositional logic. On the other hand, reasoning and learning become more complex as the expressive power of the representation increases. To gain the benefits of expressive representations while avoiding their drawbacks, intelligent systems for the real world may need to operate at all points along the axis simultaneously.

Section 2.5. Summary 59 

2.5 SUMMARY



This chapter has been something of a whirlwind tour of AI, which we have conceived of as the science of agent design. The major points to recall are as follows:

• An **agent** is something that perceives and acts in an environment. The **agent function** for an agent specifies the action taken by the agent in response to any percept sequence. • The **performance measure** evaluates the behavior of the agent in an environment. A **rational agent** acts so as to maximize the expected value of the performance measure, given the percept sequence it has seen so far.

• A **task environment** specification includes the performance measure, the external en vironment, the actuators, and the sensors. In designing an agent, the first step must always be to specify the task environment as fully as possible.

• Task environments vary along several significant dimensions. They can be fully or partially observable, single-agent or multiagent, deterministic or stochastic, episodic or sequential, static or dynamic, discrete or continuous, and known or unknown.

• The **agent program** implements the agent function. There exists a variety of basic agent-program designs reflecting the kind of information made explicit and used in the decision process. The designs vary in efficiency, compactness, and flexibility. The appropriate design of the agent program depends on the nature of the environment.

• **Simple reflex agents** respond directly to percepts, whereas **model-based reflex agents** maintain internal state to track aspects of the world that are not evident in the current percept. **Goal-based agents** act to achieve their goals, and **utility-based agents** try to maximize their own expected “happiness.”

• All agents can improve their performance through **learning**.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL NOTES

The central role of action in intelligence—the notion of practical reasoning—goes back at least as far as Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Practical reasoning was also the subject of McCarthy’s (1958) influential paper “Programs with Common Sense.” The fields of robotics and control theory are, by their very nature, concerned principally with physical agents. The

CONTROLLER concept of a **controller** in control theory is identical to that of an agent in AI. Perhaps sur prisingly, AI has concentrated for most of its history on isolated components of agents— question-answering systems, theorem-provers, vision systems, and so on—rather than on whole agents. The discussion of agents in the text by Genesereth and Nilsson (1987) was an influential exception. The whole-agent view is now widely accepted and is a central theme in recent texts (Poole *et al.*, 1998; Nilsson, 1998; Padgham and Winikoff, 2004; Jones, 2007).

Chapter 1 traced the roots of the concept of rationality in philosophy and economics. In AI, the concept was of peripheral interest until the mid-1980s, when it began to suffuse many

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discussions about the proper technical foundations of the field. A paper by Jon Doyle (1983) predicted that rational agent design would come to be seen as the core mission of AI, while other popular topics would spin off to form new disciplines.

Careful attention to the properties of the environment and their consequences for ra tional agent design is most apparent in the control theory tradition—for example, classical control systems (Dorf and Bishop, 2004; Kirk, 2004) handle fully observable, deterministic environments; stochastic optimal control (Kumar and Varaiya, 1986; Bertsekas and Shreve, 2007) handles partially observable, stochastic environments; and hybrid control (Henzinger and Sastry, 1998; Cassandras and Lygeros, 2006) deals with environments containing both discrete and continuous elements. The distinction between fully and partially observable en vironments is also central in the **dynamic programming** literature developed in the field of operations research (Puterman, 1994), which we discuss in Chapter 17.

Reflex agents were the primary model for psychological behaviorists such as Skinner (1953), who attempted to reduce the psychology of organisms strictly to input/output or stim ulus/response mappings. The advance from behaviorism to functionalism in psychology, which was at least partly driven by the application of the computer metaphor to agents (Put nam, 1960; Lewis, 1966), introduced the internal state of the agent into the picture. Most work in AI views the idea of pure reflex agents with state as too simple to provide much leverage, but work by Rosenschein (1985) and Brooks (1986) questioned this assumption (see Chapter 25). In recent years, a great deal of work has gone into finding efficient algo rithms for keeping track of complex environments (Hamscher *et al.*, 1992; Simon, 2006). The Remote Agent program (described on page 28) that controlled the Deep Space One spacecraft is a particularly impressive example (Muscettola *et al.*, 1998; Jonsson *et al.*, 2000).

Goal-based agents are presupposed in everything from Aristotle’s view of practical rea soning to McCarthy’s early papers on logical AI. Shakey the Robot (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971; Nilsson, 1984) was the first robotic embodiment of a logical, goal-based agent. A full logical analysis of goal-based agents appeared in Genesereth and Nilsson (1987), and a goal-based programming methodology called agent-oriented programming was developed by Shoham (1993). The agent-based approach is now extremely popular in software engineer ing (Ciancarini and Wooldridge, 2001). It has also infiltrated the area of operating systems,

where **autonomic computing** refers to computer systems and networks that monitor and con- AUTONOMIC COMPUTINGtrol themselves with a perceive–act loop and machine learning methods (Kephart and Chess, 2003). Noting that a collection of agent programs designed to work well together in a true multiagent environment necessarily exhibits modularity—the programs share no internal state and communicate with each other only through the environment—it is common within the field of **multiagent systems** to design the agent program of a single agent as a collection of MULTIAGENT SYSTEMSautonomous sub-agents. In some cases, one can even prove that the resulting system gives the same optimal solutions as a monolithic design.

The goal-based view of agents also dominates the cognitive psychology tradition in the area of problem solving, beginning with the enormously influential *Human Problem Solv ing* (Newell and Simon, 1972) and running through all of Newell’s later work (Newell, 1990). Goals, further analyzed as *desires* (general) and *intentions* (currently pursued), are central to the theory of agents developed by Bratman (1987). This theory has been influential both in

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natural language understanding and multiagent systems.

Horvitz *et al.* (1988) specifically suggest the use of rationality conceived as the maxi mization of expected utility as a basis for AI. The text by Pearl (1988) was the first in AI to cover probability and utility theory in depth; its exposition of practical methods for reasoning and decision making under uncertainty was probably the single biggest factor in the rapid shift towards utility-based agents in the 1990s (see Part IV).

The general design for learning agents portrayed in Figure 2.15 is classic in the machine learning literature (Buchanan *et al.*, 1978; Mitchell, 1997). Examples of the design, as em bodied in programs, go back at least as far as Arthur Samuel’s (1959, 1967) learning program for playing checkers. Learning agents are discussed in depth in Part V.

Interest in agents and in agent design has risen rapidly in recent years, partly because of the growth of the Internet and the perceived need for automated and mobile **softbot** (Etzioni and Weld, 1994). Relevant papers are collected in *Readings in Agents* (Huhns and Singh, 1998) and *Foundations of Rational Agency* (Wooldridge and Rao, 1999). Texts on multiagent systems usually provide a good introduction to many aspects of agent design (Weiss, 2000a; Wooldridge, 2002). Several conference series devoted to agents began in the 1990s, including the International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL), the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AGENTS), and the International Confer ence on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS). In 2002, these three merged to form the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS). The journal *Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems* was founded in 1998. Finally, *Dung Beetle Ecology* (Hanski and Cambefort, 1991) provides a wealth of interesting information on the behavior of dung beetles. YouTube features inspiring video recordings of their activities.

EXERCISES

**2.1** Let us examine the rationality of various vacuum-cleaner agent functions.

**a**. Show that the simple vacuum-cleaner agent function described in Figure 2.3 is indeed rational under the assumptions listed on page 38.

**b**. Describe a rational agent function for the case in which each movement costs one point. Does the corresponding agent program require internal state?

**c**. Discuss possible agent designs for the cases in which clean squares can become dirty and the geography of the environment is unknown. Does it make sense for the agent to learn from its experience in these cases? If so, what should it learn? If not, why not?

**2.2** Write an essay on the relationship between evolution and one or more of autonomy, intelligence, and learning.

**2.3** For each of the following assertions, say whether it is true or false and support your answer with examples or counterexamples where appropriate.

**a**. An agent that senses only partial information about the state cannot be perfectly rational.